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Introduction.	A	new	field:	comparative	law	and	regulation	
Francesca	Bignami	
In:	Comparative	Law	and	Regulation:	Understanding	the	Global	Regulatory	Process	
(Francesca	Bignami	&	David	Zaring	eds.,	Edward	Elgar	2016)	
When	 individuals	 post	 their	 photographs,	 shopping	 habits,	 and	 other	 personal	 data	 to	 social	
networking	sites	they	are	tracked	and	potentially	harassed	by	the	scores	of	corporate	actors	with	
access	 to	 their	 data.	 As	 governments	 worldwide	 have	 sprung	 into	 action	 to	 address	 this	
regulatory	problem,	industry	groups	and	consumer	advocates	have	also	mobilized.	To	give	but	
one	 example,	 in	 the	 past	 three	 years,	 the	 world’s	 leading	 social	 networking	 company	 has	
defended	 lawsuits	 claiming	 unfair	 consumer	 tracking	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 European	
Union	(EU),	has	settled	administrative	and	civil	enforcement	actions	brought	by	the	U.S.	Federal	
Trade	 Commission,	 the	 Belgian	Data	 Protection	Authority,	 and	 the	Hamburg	Data	 Protection	
Authority,	and	has	lobbied	for	looser	consumer-tracking	rules	in	the	European	Union,	the	United	
States,	Latin	American	countries,	and	the	Asia-Pacific	Economic	Cooperation	system.1	Although	
there	are	 substantial	 limits	on	what	 social	 networking	 sites	 can	do	with	personal	data	 in	 the	
1 In	re:	Facebook	Internet	Tracking	Litigation,	844	F.	Supp.	2d	1374	(J.D.M.L.	2012);	Case	C-362/14,	Schrems	v.	Data	
Protection	Commissioner,	2013	WL	614CJ0362	(Oct.	6,	2015);	In	re	Facebook,	Inc.,	FTC	File	No.	092	3184,	No.	C-4365	
(F.T.C.	 July	 27,	 2012);	Commissie	 voor	de	bescherming	 van	de	persoonlijke	 levenssfeer	 (Belgian	Data	Protection	
Commission),	 Recommendation	 no.	 04/2015	 (May	 13,	 2015);	Hamburgischen	Beauftragten	 für	Datenschutz	 und	
Informationsfreiheit	(Hamburg	Data	Protection	Authority),	Press	Release:	Facebook’s	Biometric	Database	Continues	
To	Be	Unlawful	(Nov.	10,	2011);	Proposal	for	a	Regulation	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	the	
Protection	of	Individuals	with	Regard	to	the	Processing	of	Personal	Data	and	on	the	Free	Movement	of	Such	Data	
(General	Data	Protection	Regulation),	COM	(2012)	11	final	(Jan.	25,	2012);	The	White	House,	Consumer	Data	Privacy	
in	a	Networked	World:	A	Framework	for	Protecting	Privacy	and	Promoting	Innovation	in	the	Global	Economy	15–18	
(2012);	 Camila	 Tobón,	 Data	 Privacy	 Laws	 in	 Latin	 America:	 An	 Overview,	 44	 International	 Law	 News	 1	 (2015)	
(reviewing	laws	of	Argentina,	Chile,	Colombia,	Costa	Rica,	Mexico,	Nicaragua,	Paraguay,	Peru,	and	Uruguay);	Asia-
Pacific	 Economic	 Cooperation	 (APEC),	The	Cross	 Border	 Privacy	 Rules	 System:	 Promoting	 Consumer	 Privacy	 and	
Economic	Growth	Across	the	APEC	Region	(Sept.	5,	2013).	
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European	Union	and	many	Latin	American	countries,	there	are	relatively	few	restrictions	in	the	
United	States	and	various	Asian	jurisdictions.		
Parabens	are	a	group	of	chemicals	widely	used	in	cosmetics	and	personal	care	products.	
Although	they	significantly	extend	the	shelf	life	of	creams	and	sprays,	they	have	also	been	linked	
to	 cancer	 and	 other	 types	 of	 health	 concerns.	 The	 regulatory	 battle	 over	whether	 to	 ban	 or	
restrict	 their	 use	 is	 occurring	 in	 legislatures,	 administrative	 agencies,	 and	 international	
organizations	 throughout	 the	 world.	 Multinational	 corporations,	 members	 of	 the	 scientific	
community,	and	environmental	and	consumer	groups	have	sparred	over	parabens	in	a	vast	array	
of	 venues—to	 name	 just	 a	 few,	 the	 U.S.	 Environmental	 Protection	 Agency,	 the	 European	
Commission,	 the	 Danish	 Environmental	 Protection	 Agency,	 the	 United	 Nations	 Environment	
Programme,	 and	 the	Association	of	 Southeast	Asian	Nations.	While	 regulators	 in	 Europe	and	
parts	of	Asia	have	recently	banned	or	restricted	certain	parabens	in	cosmetics,	regulators	in	the	
United	States,	China,	and	Latin	American	countries	continue	to	impose	no	limits	and	might	very	
well	bring	a	challenge	to	parabens	regulation	in	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO).	2		
These	are	but	two	examples	of	the	global	regulatory	process.	Regulatory	problems	are	no	
longer	confined	to	specific	countries.		By	virtue	of	how	global	communications	networks	operate,	
a	single	social	networking	site	can	be	used	by	individuals	anywhere	and	trigger	legal	action	in	a	
host	of	 jurisdictions.	 	Multinational	cosmetics	corporations	sell	the	same	products	throughout	
the	 globe	 and	 therefore	 regulators	 everywhere	 are	 called	 upon	 to	 assess	 their	 safety.	 The	
process,	 however,	 by	 which	 these	 national	 and	 international	 jurisdictions	 decide	 common	
regulatory	problems	bears	 little	 resemblance	 to	 the	domestic	 regulatory	process.	There	 is	no	
world	 government	 with	 the	 power	 to	 impose	 a	 single	 set	 of	 principles,	 institutions,	 and	
																																								 																				
2	Commission	Regulation	358/2014,	2014	O.J.	(L	107)	5	(EU);	Commission	Regulation	1004/2014,	2014	O.J.	(L	282)	5	
(EU);	Statutory	order	on	restriction	on	import,	sale	and	use	of	certain	parabens	in	cosmetic	products	for	children	
under	 3	 years	 (Denmark,	 Oct.	 11,	 2013);	 ASEAN	 Cosmetic	 Directive,	 Annex	 II	 (Association	 of	 South	 East	 Asian	
Nations);	Taylor	L.	Kraus,	Caring	About	Personal	Care	Products:	Regulation	in	the	United	States,	the	European	Union,	
and	China	in	the	Age	of	Global	Consumption	,	33	Wisconsin	International	Law	Journal	167	(2015)	(reviewing	law	of	
the	U.S.,	EU,	and	China).	
.	 
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procedures	 on	 the	 multiple	 jurisdictions,	 and	 therefore	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process	 is	
characterized	as	much	by	diversity	and	discord	as	it	is	by	coordination	and	convergence.		
As	of	yet,	the	legal	discipline	has	failed	to	develop	a	subfield	dedicated	to	understanding	
the	global	regulatory	process.	The	reason	for	the	lag	between	the	contemporary	reality	and	the	
organization	of	research	and	knowledge	building	in	the	academy	is	related	to	the	nineteenth-
century	roots	of	the	legal	discipline.	The	different	subfields	of	law	that	prevail	still	today	were	
carved	out	 in	the	heyday	of	the	nation	state:	private	 law	to	regulate	market-based	and	other	
private	 relations,	 constitutional	 law	as	 the	basic	 framework	 for	 the	organization	of	 the	 state,	
administrative	law	to	govern	public	administration,	criminal	law	for	the	police	and	prosecutors,	
and	 international	 law	 for	 inter-state	 relations	 in	 the	 international	 sphere.	 Comparative	 law,	
devoted	to	understanding	the	law	of	multiple	jurisdictions,	was	subdivided	into	these	different	
categories	 and	was	 almost	 exclusively	 focused	 on	 private	 law,	 in	 particular	 the	 contract	 law	
essential	 to	 the	 global	 commerce	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 and	 twentieth	 centuries.	What	 is	more,	
comparative	law	was	segregated	from	international	law,	conceived	as	operating	in	isolation	from	
the	internal	law	of	the	nation	state.		
The	 global	 regulatory	 process,	 a	 quintessentially	 twenty-first-century	 phenomenon,	
defies	 these	 nineteenth-century	 disciplinary	 boundaries.	 To	 begin	 with,	 regulation	 is	 an	
inherently	instrumental	activity	that	is	undertaken	by	a	variety	of	public,	and	increasingly	private,	
bodies	and	therefore	cuts	across	many	of	 the	traditional	subfields	of	 law—constitutional	 law,	
administrative	law,	civil	procedure,	criminal	procedure,	and	different	types	of	private	law.		More	
to	the	point	of	the	global	character	of	contemporary	regulation,	what	field	of	law	is	important	
for	the	regulatory	function	can	vary	enormously	between	jurisdictions.	It	may	be	that	in	some	
places	a	 rule	such	as	a	ban	on	consumer	 tracking	 is	enforced	 largely	by	criminal	prosecutors,	
under	 the	 principles	 of	 criminal	 procedure,	while	 in	 other	 places	 administrative	 proceedings,	
governed	 by	 administrative	 law,	 are	 more	 important.	 And	 the	 law	 of	 both	 national	 and	
international	jurisdictions	is	critical.		A	Danish	rule	banning	parabens	can	easily	be	undone	by	a	
contrary	EU	rule	or	an	adverse	WTO	ruling.		In	sum,	the	conventional	boundaries	that	separate	
the	different	subfields	of	law	operate	as	a	real	obstacle	to	understanding	how	global	regulatory	
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problems	are	handled	by	the	multiple	legal	systems,	domestic	and	international,	that	are	called	
into	action.		
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 introduction	 and	 the	 volume	 as	 a	 whole	 is	 to	 overcome	 these	
traditional	 disciplinary	 limitations	 and	 to	 set	 down	 the	 foundations	 for	 a	 new	 field	 of	 legal	
research	capable	of	illuminating	the	global	regulatory	process—comparative	law	and	regulation.	
To	 begin	 with,	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 set	 forth	 a	 working	 definition	 of	 regulation.	 The	 concept	 of	
regulation	is	used	in	a	variety	of	ways	in	the	social	scientific	and	legal	literatures	(Kahn,	1970:	11;	
Selznick,	1985:	363–64;	Black,	2002:	1).	Since	the	purpose	of	the	field	of	comparative	law	and	
regulation	 is	 to	 cover	 the	 great	 variety	 of	 jurisdictions	 that	 interact	 in	 the	 global	 regulatory	
process,	the	definition	proposed	here	is	broad:	regulation	is	a	form	of	governance	designed	to	
address	 complex	 social,	 environmental,	 and	 economic	 problems	 that	 relies	 heavily	 on	 rules,	
enforced	against	market	actors,	and	administrative	authorities.	This	definition	recognizes	that	
administrative	authorities	are	pivotal,	but	not	exclusive,	institutions	in	the	regulatory	process	and	
that	 regulatory	 output	 is	 fashioned	 also	 by	 other	 institutions,	 including	 legislatures,	 public	
prosecutors,	 courts,	 and	 private	 bodies.	 The	 definition	 employed	 here	 also	 identifies	 legally	
binding	 rules,	 enforced	 against	 market	 actors,	 as	 the	 typical	 technique	 of	 regulation	 but	
acknowledges	that	standards	can	be	contained	in	other	types	of	instruments,	such	as	soft	law,	
and	that	standards	can,	in	some	policy	areas,	be	applied	against	civil	society	and	public	actors.			
Comparative	 law	 and	 regulation	 investigates	 the	 law	 that	 applies	 to	 this	 regulatory	
function.	It	covers	all	the	law	of	the	regulatory	process,	regardless	of	the	branch	of	law	to	which	
it	 formally	 belongs,	 and	 it	 includes	 all	 jurisdictions	 in	which	 such	 law	operates,	 regardless	 of	
whether	such	jurisdictions	are	classified	as	national	or	international.	Since	the	goal	of	the	field	of	
comparative	law	and	regulation	is	to	capture	the	fundamental	elements	of	the	global	regulatory	
process,	the	focus	is	more	on	the	institutional	and	legal	building	blocks	of	the	many	jurisdictions	
and	 less	 on	 the	 technical	 substance	 of	 particular	 policy	 areas.	 Comparative	 policy	 studies,	
however,	can	serve	as	a	device	for	revealing	more	general	properties	of	the	global	regulatory	
process	and,	to	the	extent	this	is	the	case,	they	are	also	included.		
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At	the	same	time	as	comparative	law	and	regulation	moves	beyond	the	limitations	of	the	
established	 legal	 discipline,	 it	 is	 situated	 in	 the	 field	 of	 comparative	 law.	 That	 is	 because	
comparative	law	has	developed	a	series	of	theoretical	and	analytical	tools,	albeit	in	the	context	
of	 private	 law,	 that	 are	 particularly	 apt	 for	 understanding	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process.	 The	
discipline	of	comparative	law	was	born	in	the	era	of	the	globalization	of	commerce	and	has	been	
devoted	in	large	part	to	building	the	intellectual	apparatus	necessary	to	understand	commercial	
transactions	 that	 straddle	 multiple	 jurisdictions	 (Zimmermann,	 2008).	 The	 globalization	 of	
regulation	shares	many	of	the	same	attributes	as	the	earlier	globalization	and	therefore	the	lines	
of	 theoretical	 inquiry	 central	 to	 comparative	 law	 can	 serve,	 after	 extensive	modification,	 to	
analyze	the	regulatory	process	as	it	unfolds	across	the	world.			
The	global	regulatory	process	is	characterized	by	three	essential	properties:	jurisdictional	
differences	and	commonalities;	legal	convergence	and	divergence	over	time	driven	by	social	and	
political	processes;	and	 the	prescription	of	new	 law	by	political	and	 legal	operators	based	on	
comparison.3	 To	 illustrate	 briefly	 with	 the	 examples	 of	 consumer	 tracking	 and	 parabens	
regulation:	Consumer	tracking	rules	and	regulatory	enforcement	 in	 the	United	States	and	the	
Asia-Pacific	Economic	Cooperation	system	are	fairly	similar,	and	differ	considerably	from	those	
same	rules	and	regulatory	enforcement	in	the	European	Union	and	Argentina.	Although	the	rules	
and	licensing	procedures	for	parabens	vary	considerably	across	the	world	today,	 in	the	future	
they	may—or	may	not—converge.	Convergence	might	be	on	the	relatively	permissive	American	
model,	because	countries	seek	to	attract	investment	from	American	firms	and	are	swayed	by	free	
market	arguments,	or	 it	might	be	on	the	tougher	European	model,	because	countries	wish	to	
guarantee	access	 for	 their	corporations	to	the	EU	market	and	are	persuaded	by	the	so-called	
“precautionary	principle”	(Scott,	2009;	Bradford,	2012).		And	regardless	of	whether	the	outcome	
is	convergence	or	divergence,	the	legal	and	political	operators	engaged	in	the	global	regulatory	
process	argue	in	favor	of	new	law	based	on	comparison.	The	odds	are	that	privacy	advocates	will	
make	the	case	for	more	public	enforcement	of	consumer-tracking	rules	in	the	United	States	and	
																																								 																				
3	Throughout	this	chapter,	the	terms	“prescribe”	and	“prescription”	refer	to	the	normative	activity	of	recommending	
new	domestic	laws	and	international	legal	instruments.	“Prescribe”	and	“prescription”	are	not	used	to	refer	to	the	
actual	enactment	of	such	laws	and	legal	instruments,	which	may	or	may	not	be	the	consequence	of	the	arguments	
and	recommendations	of	legal	and	political	operators.		
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East	Asia	based	on	the	example	of	European	data	protection	authorities.	Multinational	cosmetics	
corporations,	 by	 contrast,	 are	 likely	 to	 draw	 inspiration	 from	 the	 U.S.	 system	 of	 chemicals	
regulation	to	oppose	licensing	for	parabens	and	other	chemicals	in	Latin	America.			
Within	 the	 field	 of	 comparative	 law,	 there	 are	 three	 lines	 of	 inquiry	 that	 can,	 with	
significant	adaptation	and	development,	shed	light	on	each	of	these	key	characteristics	of	the	
global	regulatory	process.	Classifications	serve	to	describe	and	chart	legal	variation	globally	and	
are	 an	 important	 tool	 for	understanding	 the	different	 legal	 responses	 generated	by	 common	
policy	problems	(David	and	Brierly,	1978;	Zweigert	and	Kötz,	1998).	The	causal	theory	of	 legal	
transplants	 (Watson,	1974),	also	known	as	diffusion	 in	 the	 social	 scientific	 literature	 (Dobbin,	
Simmons,	 and	 Garrett,	 2007),	 points	 to	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 regulatory	 institutions,	
principles,	and	procedures	are	likely	to	converge	across	the	multiple	jurisdictions	involved	in	the	
global	 regulatory	 process.	 And	 the	 functional	method	 of	 comparative	 law,	 together	with	 the	
many	debates	that	it	has	generated,	is	the	prevalent	normative	theory	in	the	academy	for	how	
political	and	legal	operators	should	compare	to	prescribe	new	law	(Rabel,	[1924]	1967;	Zweigert,	
1951;	David,	1955;	Zweigert	and	Kötz,	1998;	Basedow,	2014).	
The	rest	of	this	chapter	proceeds	as	follows.	The	next	section	reviews	the	existing	fields	
of	legal	research	that	have	considered	aspects	of	the	global	regulatory	process	and	explains	their	
shortcomings—comparative	 administrative	 law,	 global	 administrative	 law,	 and	 comparative	
socio-legal	studies.		The	chapter	then	turns	to	a	systematic	exposition	of	the	object	of	study	of	
comparative	law	and	regulation.	First,	it	outlines	the	elements	of	law	that	are	compared	across	
the	different	jurisdictions,	both	domestic	and	international,	and	that	are	essential	to	the	multiple	
jurisdictions	that	contribute	to	the	global	regulatory	process:	the	law	of	rulemaking,	regulatory	
oversight,	regulatory	enforcement,	and	judicial	review.	Secondly,	the	introduction	puts	forward	
the	three	lines	of	theorization,	drawn	from	the	field	of	comparative	law,	that	offer	the	greatest	
promise	for	understanding	the	essential	characteristics	of	the	global	regulatory	process	and	that	
are	 central	 to	 the	 field	 of	 comparative	 law	 and	 regulation.	 In	 presenting	 classifications,	 legal	
transplants,	 and	 the	 functional	 method,	 the	 chapter	 develops	 each	 area	 of	 theoretical	
investigation	for	the	public	law	sphere	and	the	novel	context	of	global	regulatory	governance.	It	
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proposes	 two	 new	 classifications:	 in	 the	 first,	 the	 categories	 reflect	 historical	 and	 doctrinal	
theories	of	how	public	law	should	discipline	the	regulatory	function;	in	the	second,	the	categories	
are	based	on	models	of	legitimate	private	involvement	in	public	regulation.	As	explained	below,	
legal	transplants	in	the	regulatory	domain	can	be	caused	by	a	number	of	different	factors,	but	
one	 in	 particular—power—has	 been	 neglected	 in	 the	 existing	 transplant	 literature.	 	 And,	 in	
unpacking	the	functional	method	of	legal	prescription,	the	chapter	dwells	on	what	is	generally	
the	 last	 stage	 of	 the	 comparative	 analysis,	 that	 is,	 recommending	 a	 new	 domestic	 law	 or	
international	 legal	 instrument	 based	 on	 the	 “better”	 law	 that	 has	 been	 revealed	 by	 the	
comparative	survey.	This	chapter	underscores	the	need	for	comparative	analysis	to	be	explicit	as	
to	the	normative	criteria	that	are	used	to	identify	the	law	of	one	jurisdiction	as	superior	to	the	
laws	 of	 other	 jurisdictions,	 i.e.,	 the	 “better”	 law.	 It	 also	 urges	 researchers	 to	 investigate	
empirically	the	operation	of	what,	in	appearance,	is	the	“better”	law,	to	ascertain	that,	in	actual	
fact,	it	meets	the	normative	criteria.		
The	introduction	concludes	with	a	survey	of	the	individual	contributions	to	the	volume.	
The	survey	shows	that	even	though	the	authors	work	in	a	number	of	traditional	subfields	of	law,	
it	 is	 possible	 to	 construct	 an	 intellectually	 compelling	 topography	 of	 the	 emerging	 field	 of	
comparative	law	and	regulation.	The	review	of	the	individual	chapters	also	discusses	how	they	
illuminate	the	theoretical	conclusions	outlined	in	the	main	part	of	the	introduction.		Overall,	the	
chapters	reveal	the	practical	and	scholarly	payoffs	that	come	from	building	a	new	field	of	inquiry	
dedicated	to	comparative	law	and	regulation.	
	
EXISTING	RESEARCH	TRADITIONS	
 
There	are	three	existing	fields	of	legal	research	that	have	addressed	elements	of	how	regulation	
operates	worldwide:	comparative	administrative	law,	global	administrative	law,	and	socio-legal	
studies.	Although	these	research	traditions	have	made	significant	advances,	they	also	suffer	from	
critical	limitations	related	to	their	disciplinary	foundations.	Driving	scholarship	in	each	field	is	a	
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set	of	assumptions	and	categories	that	indicate	what	to	study,	using	which	theories	and	methods.	
In	each	case,	the	assumptions	and	categories	are	ill	suited	to	understanding	how	policy	problems	
such	 as	 consumer	 tracking,	 parabens,	 and	many	others	 are	 handled	by	 the	 global	 regulatory	
process.		
	
Comparative	Administrative	Law	
 
Comparative	 administrative	 law	 is	 focused	 on	 bureaucratic	 authority,	 broadly	 speaking.	 The	
object	of	comparison	is	the	institution	of	public	administration	and	the	national	laws	that	govern	
the	operation	of	public	 administration	 in	different	 jurisdictions	 (Goodnow,	1893;	 Ziller,	 1993;	
Fromont,	2006;	Bell,	2008;	Rose-Ackerman	and	Lindseth,	2010).		Since	the	work	of	administration	
is,	at	least	to	some	degree,	the	functional	task	of	regulating	economy	and	society,	comparing	the	
law	of	administration	in	different	countries	can	shed	light	on	the	multiple	legal	systems	involved	
in	global	regulation.	But	note	that	the	overlap	between	administration	and	regulation,	together	
with	 their	 respective	 governing	 laws,	 is	 imperfect	 to	 say	 the	 least.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	
administrative	law,	and	hence	comparative	administrative	law,	is	under-inclusive.	Depending	on	
the	country,	the	regulatory	process	can	involve	a	number	of	public	and	private	bodies	outside	of	
public	administration:	the	political	branches,	which	set	down	the	regulatory	agenda	and	which	
are	 governed	 by	 constitutional	 law;	 public	 prosecutors,	 who	 pursue	 criminal	 actions	 for	
regulatory	 offenses	 subject	 to	 the	 rules	 of	 criminal	 procedure;	 private	 litigants,	 who	 seek	
compensation	for	regulatory	breaches	in	the	courts	under	the	law	of	civil	procedure;	and	private	
regulatory	bodies,	which	undertake	self-regulation,	and	which	act	under	a	combination	of	public	
and	private	law	(Coglianese	and	Kagan,	2007).		
On	the	other	hand,	administrative	law,	and	therefore	comparative	administrative	law	too,	
can	be	over-inclusive	with	respect	to	regulation.	In	the	case	of	the	United	States,	administration	
is	 largely	 synonymous	 with	 regulation	 because	 of	 the	 early	 use	 of	 regulation	 to	 govern	 the	
economy,	as	opposed	 to	 state	ownership	and	 industrial	planning,	and	because	of	 the	 federal	
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organization	 of	 government,	 which	 leaves	most	 responsibility	 for	 functions	 such	 as	 land-use	
planning	to	state	and	local	government	and	separate	subfields	of	law	(Breyer	et	al.,	2011).	But	
the	American	experience	is	unique.	In	most	other	jurisdictions,	the	opposite	is	the	case:	the	work	
of	 administration	 is	 only	 in	 small	 part	 regulation	 and	 instead	 is	 focused	 on	 providing	 basic	
services,	 managing	 welfare	 schemes,	 overseeing	 land-use	 planning,	 and	 other	 types	 of	
government	activities.	The	functions	of	public	administration	can	entail	a	lot	besides	regulation	
and	therefore	administrative	law	can	include	rules	and	principles	that	are	not	aimed	specifically	
at	the	regulatory	function	but	at	other	types	of	government	activities	(Ziller,	1993).	
Although	the	mismatch	between	administrative	law	and	regulatory	law	is	a	handicap	for	
any	legal	inquiry	focused	on	regulation,	even	purely	domestic	regulation,	it	is	especially	so	in	the	
global	 context.	 Comparing	 administrative	 law	 falls	 into	 the	 trap	 of	 comparing	 the	 proverbial	
apples	and	oranges	(Dannemann,	2008;	Valcke,	2012).	At	best,	comparative	administrative	law	
risks	being	relatively	uninformative	on	how	the	law	governs	the	regulatory	function	in	different	
jurisdictions:	 in	 some	 countries,	 regulation	 may	 be	 handled	 by	 legal	 actors	 other	 than	
administration,	such	as	legislators	and	criminal	prosecutors,	while	in	other	countries	there	may	
be	very	little	regulation	at	all.		At	worst,	comparative	administrative	law	can	be	misleading:	from	
the	outside,	certain	principles	and	procedures	of	administrative	law	might	be	mistaken	for	the	
law	applicable	to	the	regulatory	function	when	in	actual	fact	they	govern	only	land-use	planning,	
civil	service	management,	or	another	function	of	public	administration	that	is	more	important	in	
the	foreign	jurisdiction.		In	sum,	it	is	necessary	to	develop	an	object	of	legal	study	that	is	centered	
on	the	functional	task	of	regulating,	not	on	the	historical	and	nation-specific	contours	of	public	
administration,	in	order	to	successfully	cross	borders	and	understand	the	regulatory	process	in	
the	many	jurisdictions	that	today	weigh	in	on	global	policy	problems	such	as	consumer	tracking	
and	parabens.		
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Global	Administrative	Law	
 
Global	administrative	 law	studies	 the	numerous	 international	administrative	bodies	 that	have	
mushroomed	 over	 the	 past	 decades	 (Kingsbury,	 Krisch,	 and	 Stewart,	 2005;	 Cassese,	 2016).	
Broadly	 speaking,	 global	 administrative	 law	 is	 the	 international	 counterpart	 of	 comparative	
administrative	 law:	 the	 object	 of	 inquiry	 is	 administration	 and	 the	 law	 that	 applies	 to	
administration—just	international	not	national—and	the	theoretical	concern	is	the	authority	and	
legitimacy	of	administration.	By	including	international	legal	systems	among	the	jurisdictions	that	
are	important	to	the	regulatory	process,	this	book	draws	on	the	insights	of	global	administrative	
law.	Scholarship	in	global	administrative	law,	however,	tends	to	conceptualize	the	international	
level	 as	 fundamentally	 different	 from	 the	 national	 level	 and	 to	 analyze	 global	 administrative	
bodies	 in	 isolation	or,	at	most,	as	vertically	situated	above	national	bodies.	 	But,	as	discussed	
earlier,	the	very	same	regulatory	problem	can	be	handled	by	national	systems	like	the	United	
States	and	Belgium,	international	systems	like	the	WTO	and	the	UN	Environment	Programme,	
and	 in-between	 systems	 like	 the	 European	Union.	 The	 different	 jurisdictions	 interact	 and,	 in	
doing	so,	generate	the	global	regulatory	process.	Therefore,	to	understand	this	global	regulatory	
process,	 it	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 focus	 on	 only	 one	 set	 of	 actors	 and	 law,	 even	 though,	 being	
international,	 global	 administrative	 bodies	 might	 appear	 to	 be	 the	 most	 important	 for	
understanding	the	worldwide	dimension	of	regulation.	In	many	regulatory	areas,	and	at	many	
stages	of	the	regulatory	process,	national	jurisdictions	are	the	key	players.	Even	more	important,	
the	global	regulatory	process	is	the	product	of	complex	interaction	among	jurisdictions—vertical	
and	 horizontal—and	 therefore	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 develop	 a	 single	 set	 of	 theoretical	 and	
methodological	tools	aimed	specifically	at	that	interaction.		
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Socio-legal	Research	
 
The	 third	 line	 of	 scholarship	 to	 have	 addressed	 elements	 of	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process	 is	
comparative	 socio-legal	 research	 (Kagan	 and	 Axelrad,	 2000;	 Kagan,	 2001).	 	 Studies	 in	 this	
tradition	generally	focus	on	a	specific	type	of	regulatory	objective,	such	as	safe	nursing	homes	or	
clean	water,	investigate	empirically	how	these	objectives	are	achieved	in	different	national	legal	
systems,	and,	depending	on	the	study,	assess	whether	some	systems	are	more	effective	than	
others	 (Vogel,	1986;	Braithwaite	and	Braithwaite,	1995).	 	This	 research	 is	 legal	 realist	and,	as	
such,	 serves	as	an	essential	 complement	 to	 the	 largely	doctrinal	 research	 conducted	by	 legal	
scholars.	Nevertheless,	the	empirical	questions	and	theories	that	guide	socio-legal	research	are	
quite	narrow.	Since	the	central	concern	is	how	law	impacts	society,	comparative	studies	in	this	
tradition	generally	 investigate	specific	 types	of	regulatory	policy	with	direct	consequences	 for	
social	and	economic	outcomes—health	regulations,	environmental	regulations,	and	so	on—and	
the	 enforcement	 of	 that	 policy	 by	 state	 officials	 (Hutter,	 1988;	May	 and	Winter,	 2000;	May,	
2003).		Yet	the	global	regulatory	process	encompasses	many	other	types	of	law	and	institutional	
actors:	the	basic	legal	framework	that	guides	how	regulation	is	made	and	enforced,	from	start	to	
finish,	and	the	public	and	private	actors	responsible	not	only	for	enforcing,	but	also	for	making,	
overseeing,	and	adjudicating	regulation.	In	other	words,	it	is	necessary	to	develop	an	empirically	
sensitive	 research	 agenda	 that	 takes	 a	 broader	 view	 of	 the	 law	 that	 matters	 in	 the	 global	
regulatory	process.	To	return	to	the	parabens	example,	it	is	important	to	analyze	and	assess	not	
simply	the	policy	output	of	parabens	regulation	but	the	legal	and	political	process	that	gave	rise	
to,	and	that	drives	the	operation	of,	that	parabens	regulation.		
	
ESTABLISHING	THE	FIELD	
	
There	are	two	steps	to	outlining	the	field	of	comparative	law	and	regulation.	The	first	is	to	set	
down	systematically	the	law,	throughout	the	world,	that	is	the	object	of	study.	The	second	is	to	
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sketch	the	theories	and	methods	that	are	most	promising	for	understanding	the	global	regulatory	
process	and	how	the	multiple	jurisdictions,	domestic	and	international,	interact	to	generate	the	
global	regulatory	process.		
	
What	Law?		
	
The	field	of	comparative	law	and	regulation	investigates	the	law	that	applies	to	the	regulatory	
function,	in	whatever	jurisdiction	that	function	is	undertaken.	The	regulatory	function	and	the	
applicable	 law,	 that	 is,	 	 the	 regulatory	process,	 are	 conceived	 sequentially:	making	 the	 rules,	
overseeing	and	revising	the	rules,	enforcing	the	rules,	and	reviewing	the	rules	in	court.		At	each	
phase,	certain	actors	and	certain	areas	of	law,	as	defined	by	the	traditional	legal	discipline,	play	
a	more	prominent	role.	When	rules	are	made,	legislatures	and	administrative	agencies,	operating	
under	constitutional	and	administrative	 law,	are	 important.	Oversight	 is	 carried	out	by	public	
authorities	 acting	 largely	 under	 administrative	 law	 and,	 less	 often,	 constitutional	 law.	
Enforcement	is	conducted	by	administrative	agencies	and	courts,	at	the	behest	of	either	public	
prosecutors	or	private	class	actions,	and,	depending	on	the	type	of	enforcement,	 triggers	 the	
principles	of	administrative	law	and	criminal	and	civil	procedure.	Judicial	review	is	handled	by	the	
courts	and	is	guided	by	constitutional	and	administrative	law.	Private	bodies	can	be	allowed	to	
exercise	one	or	more	of	these	regulatory	powers	and,	in	doing	so,	they	are	governed	by	corporate	
law,	labor	law,	and	contract	law,	as	well	as	public	law	on	permissible	delegations	and	freedom	of	
association	and	speech.	To	illustrate	with	an	example	well	known	to	lawyers,	the	rules	of	conduct	
for	 the	profession	 can	be	developed	by	private	bar	 associations,	 overseen	by	 the	media	 and	
private	watchdog	organizations,	enforced	by	disgruntled	clients	in	a	dispute	resolution	process	
managed	by	 the	bar,	and	reviewed,	at	 least	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	 in	 the	course	of	 the	dispute	
resolution	process.	Although	the	primary	focus	of	the	field	is	regulatory	institutions,	principles,	
and	 procedures,	 comparative	 studies	 of	 specific	 regulatory	 policies—the	 details	 of	 when	
consumer	tracking	data	can	be	sold,	what	chemicals	are	contained	in	cosmetics,	and	so	on—can	
reveal	more	general	properties	of	the	regulatory	process	and	therefore	are	included	to	the	extent	
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that	 they	 serve	 those	 purposes.	 	 The	 terminology	 employed	 in	 this	 discussion	 reflects	 the	
categories	 that	 have	 been	 developed	 in	 domestic	 law,	 not	 the	 vocabulary	 typically	 used	 in	
international	law.	The	reader,	however,	should	keep	in	mind	that	this	exposition	of	regulatory	
law	is	intended	to	apply	to	both	domestic	and	international	jurisdictions.		
[Figure	I.1	here]	
Figure	I.1	sets	out	the	components	of	the	regulatory	process	and	the	corresponding	law	included	
in	the	field	of	comparative	law	and	regulation.	It	should	be	kept	in	mind	that	even	though	the	
flow	chart	format	is	a	useful	heuristic,	the	order	of	the	regulatory	phases	is	not	set	in	stone	and	
sometimes	they	can	occur	in	a	different	sequence.		
Table	I.1	below	summarizes	the	coverage	of	regulatory	law	and	jurisdictions	provided	by	
the	contributions	to	this	volume.	For	each	stage	in	the	regulatory	process,	it	indicates	the	precise	
type	of	law	and	the	specific	jurisdictions	analyzed	in	the	individual	contributions.	For	purposes	of	
clarity,	the	volume	follows	a	classic	tripartite	scheme	that	moves	from	the	most	traditional	form	
of	regulation—by	state	authorities	at	the	domestic	level—to	forms	that	are	considered	relatively	
novel—private	 regulation	 (at	 both	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	 levels)	 and	 international	
jurisdictions.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	European	Union	defies	easy	classification	and,	for	
some	 purposes,	 is	 treated	 as	 a	 domestic	 jurisdiction	 and,	 for	 others,	 as	 an	 international	
jurisdiction.	 	 The	 EU’s	 variable	 status	 is	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 uneven	 character	 of	 European	
integration:	 at	 the	 rulemaking	 stage,	 in	many	 policy	 areas,	 the	 EU	 exercises	 the	 power	 of	 a	
domestic	 jurisdiction,	 but	 at	 the	 enforcement	 stage,	 the	 EU	 generally	 only	 has	 supervisory	
powers,	and	authority	continues	to	rest	primarily	with	the	member	states.	
[Table	I.1	here]	
Before	proceeding	any	further,	it	is	important	to	underscore	one	point	which	might	not	
emerge	clearly	enough	from	this	exposition	of	the	regulatory	process.	For	most	lawyers	trained	
in	the	law	of	a	particular	jurisdiction,	the	default	position	is	that	the	regulatory	process	occurs,	
from	start	to	finish,	within	that	jurisdiction.	But	this	assumption	no	longer	holds	in	the	face	of	
globalization.	It	is	not	just	that	there	are	parallel	regulatory	processes	on	common	problems	such	
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as	consumer	tracking	and	parabens	that	are	occurring	simultaneously	in	different	jurisdictions	
throughout	 the	 world.	 Rather,	 in	 some	 cases,	 before	 a	 specific	 set	 of	 rules	 can	 take	 effect,	
multiple	jurisdictions	can	be	called	into	action.	The	most	obvious	jurisdictional	configuration	is	
the	vertical	relationship	between	international	regimes	and	participating	states.	Domestic	rules	
are	 often	 subject	 to	 regulatory	 oversight	 and	 judicial	 review	 by	 international	 regimes.	 For	
instance,	 an	 EU	 rule	 on	 parabens	must	 be	 notified	 to	 a	WTO	 oversight	 committee4	 and	 can	
potentially	 trigger	 judicial	 review	 in	 the	WTO	Dispute	Settlement	Body	 (Shaffer,	 this	volume).	
Intervention	in	the	domestic	regulatory	process	can	even	be	horizontal,	from	another	domestic	
jurisdiction.	For	example,	a	privacy	rule	issued	by	the	U.S.	Federal	Trade	Commission	that	limits	
consumer	 tracking	 is	 subject	 to	 an	 adequacy	 determination	 in	 the	 EU,	 which	 entails	 both	
regulatory	oversight	by	the	privacy	authority	and,	possibly,	judicial	review	in	the	Court	of	Justice	
of	the	EU.5	In	sum,	to	navigate	the	contemporary,	global,	regulatory	process,	it	is	vital	to	know	
the	law	of	multiple	jurisdictions	and	to	appreciate	that,	at	any	point	in	the	regulatory	process,	
those	laws	may	intersect.		
To	 better	 understand	 the	 scope	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 law	 covered	 by	 the	 field	 of	
comparative	 law	 and	 regulation,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 provide	 some	 historical	 context.	 Like	
constitutional	and	administrative	law	and	their	comparative	counterparts,	the	emergence	of	the	
field	 of	 comparative	 law	 and	 regulation	 is	 linked	 to	 a	 concrete	 set	 of	 political	 and	 social	
developments.	Regulation,	like	written	constitutions	and	public	administration,	is	a	distinct	type	
of	 historical	 and	 social	 phenomenon	 that	 is	 not	 universal	 to	 all	 human	 societies.	 With	 the	
exception	of	the	United	States,	regulation	has	become	a	pervasive	form	of	state	governance	only	
in	 the	past	 thirty	 years	 (Levi-Faur,	2005;	 Scott,	 2006;	Dubash	and	Morgan,	2012).	 The	 rise	of	
regulation	 is	 directly	 tied	 to	 the	 extensive	 privatization	 and	 liberalization	 of	 markets	 that	
occurred	in	many	countries	beginning	in	the	1980s	(Suleiman	and	Waterbury,	1990;	Thatcher,	
2007).	Before,	government	intervention	in	the	economy	was	direct—through	state	ownership	of	
																																								 																				
4	World	Trade	Organization,	Committee	on	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade,	Notification,	G/TBT/N/EU/157	(Oct.	1,	2013).	
5	Article	29	Data	Protection	Working	Party,	Opinion	4/2000	on	the	level	of	protection	provided	by	the	“Safe	Harbor	
Principles”	(May	16,	2000);	Commission	Decision	520/2000/EC,	2000	O.J.	(L	215)	7	(EC);	Case	C-362/14,	Schrems	v.	
Data	 Protection	 Commissioner,	 2013	 WL	 614CJ0362	 (Oct.	 6,	 2015).	 For	 these	 purposes,	 the	 EU	 operates	 as	 a	
domestic	jurisdiction	since	it	has	no	international	law	claim	of	authority	over	the	U.S.	
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market	sectors	and	extensive	industrial	planning.	Since	then,	even	though	countries	still	seek	to	
accomplish	many	of	 the	same	fundamental	policy	objectives,	 they	do	so	by	governing	private	
markets	actors	with	rules	(Majone,	1994;	S.	Vogel,	1996;	Levi-Faur	and	Gilad,	2004;	Kelemen,	this	
volume;	Shaffer,	this	volume).	Rules	are	now	necessary	both	to	create	and	maintain	competitive	
markets	and	to	further	a	variety	of	social,	environmental,	and	redistributive	policies	that	can	no	
longer	be	achieved	by	directly	managing	the	economy.	The	regulatory	technique	also	has	tended	
to	favor	a	certain	type	of	government	institution:	the	specialized	administrative	authority	with	
the	knowledge	and	resources	necessary	to	regulate	a	particular	market	sector	and	regulatory	
problem	(Kelemen,	this	volume;	Shaffer,	this	volume).	As	is	underscored	by	this	exposition	of	the	
regulatory	function	and	the	relevant	law,	summarized	in	Figure	I.1,	administrative	agencies	are	
pivotal:	they	engage	in	both	rulemaking	and	rule	enforcement	and,	as	a	result,	they	are	the	prime	
target	of	both	oversight	and	judicial	review.			
The	emergence	of	the	field	of	comparative	law	and	regulation	has	been	driven	not	only	
by	the	rise	of	a	common	mode	of	governance	for	achieving	policy	objectives—regulation—but	
also	by	 the	diffusion	of	 a	 certain	 type	of	 legal	 system—liberal	 democracy	 (Huntington,	 1991;	
Simmons,	Dobbin,	and	Garrett,	2008).		This	definition	of	the	regulatory	process,	and	what	law	
can	be	analyzed	as	belonging	to	that	regulatory	process	regardless	of	the	jurisdiction,	is	as	much	
a	product	of	the	instrumental	activity	of	regulating	as	it	is	of	the	regime	type	of	liberal	democracy.	
Even	the	simple	division	of	labor	between	making	rules	and	enforcing	rules,	which	might	seem	
necessary	to	an	area	of	human	activity	 like	governing	markets,	 is	 the	product	of	a	distinctive,	
liberal	order	that	insists	that	first	rules	be	made	and	publicized	and	that	only	then	can	citizens	be	
subject	to	enforcement	action	by	their	governments	(MacCormick,	1999:	115).	 	The	oversight	
and	judicial	review	components	of	the	regulatory	process	illustrate	even	more	clearly	how	this	
conceptualization	of	an	object	of	legal	study	that	can	cross	national	borders	and	domestic	law	
books	is	tied	to	a	certain	form	of	government	which,	with	the	diffusion	of	liberal	democracy,	has	
become	more	 prevalent	 today:	 the	 checks	 and	 balances	 afforded	 by	 external	 oversight	 and	
judicial	review	are,	by	definition,	irrelevant	to	an	autocratic	regime	but	essential	to	a	liberal	one	
(Mannori	and	Sordi,	2001).		
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This	logic	of	liberal	democracy	is	all	the	more	true	of	the	specific	types	of	regulatory	law	
included	in	this	volume	under	each	stage	of	the	regulatory	process.	The	legal	procedures	by	which	
the	public	participates	in	rulemaking	are	generally	enacted	to	further	the	public	accountability	
important	 in	 liberal	democracies.	So	 too	 for	 laws	guaranteeing	citizens	access	 to	government	
documents	and	requiring	that	regulation	take	into	account	environmental	and	economic	impacts.	
The	criminal	and	civil	procedure	analyzed	in	this	volume	is	assessed	based	on	both	the	effective	
implementation	of	regulatory	policy	and	the	respect	 for	 liberal	rights.	 	The	section	on	 judicial	
review	analyzes	principles—proportionality,	 the	 right	 to	health,	and	participation	 rights—that	
are	meaningful	within	the	broader	context	of	liberal	democracy.			
In	sum,	the	field	of	comparative	law	and	regulation	and	the	assessment	of	what	law	to	
cover	 are	 built	 on	 the	 historical	 trend,	 experienced	 across	many	 parts	 of	 the	world,	 toward	
regulating	in	line	with	liberal	democratic	principles	of	public	law.	That	is	a	far	cry	from	saying	that	
the	regulatory	process	across	the	globe	is	identical	and	indeed,	as	described	below,	one	of	the	
essential	ambitions	of	the	field	is	to	capture	the	extensive	variation	that	separates	jurisdictions.	
Not	all	 jurisdictions	will	have	all	 types	of	regulatory	 law	and	even	 if	 they	do,	 it	may	very	well	
operate	in	quite	different	ways.		This	intellectual	framework	can	even	encompass	authoritarian	
regimes:		many	jurisdictions	that	are	considered	authoritarian	have	law	to	compare	on	certain	
elements	of	the	regulatory	process	and,	in	those	cases	in	which	there	is	no	law	to	be	found,	the	
silence	can	also	be	 instructive.	 	 In	other	words,	 it	 is	 important	 to	be	mindful	of	 the	historical	
origins	of	the	categories	and	assumptions	that	serve	to	organize	the	field	but,	at	the	same	time,	
it	is	vital	to	include	as	many		jurisdictions	as	possible	in	the	comparative	projects	of	the	field.	
To	conclude	this	section,	it	bears	pointing	out	what	is	not	covered	by	comparative	law	
and	regulation.	Although	the	definition	of	the	regulatory	function	and	the	applicable	law	might	
appear	so	capacious	as	to	include	all	 law,	there	are	plenty	of	areas	that	are	excluded	because	
they	are	too	far	removed	from	the	regulatory	function.	This	is	true	for	the	substantive	principles	
of	private	law	and	criminal	law.	In	both	contexts,	background	principles	on	what	type	of	actions	
can	give	rise	to	civil	liability	or	criminal	punishment	can	sometimes	limit	the	scope	of	regulatory	
enforcement.	 Because	 those	 principles,	 however,	 are	 driven	 by	more	 general	 considerations	
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related	to	duties	of	care	and	culpability,	and	not	by	the	regulatory	schemes	enacted	to	address	
particular	economic	and	social	problems,	they	are	peripheral	to	the	main	object	of	inquiry.	The	
constitutional	law	that	governs	elections	and	other	aspects	of	what	might	broadly	be	called	the	
law	 of	 democracy	 is	 also	 excluded.	 Even	 though	 elections,	 political	 parties,	 and	 general	
parliamentary	 procedure	 undoubtedly	 influence	 regulation,	 they,	 together	 with	 their	 legal	
framework,	are	too	far	removed	from	the	process	of	enacting	specific	regulatory	norms	to	be	
considered	part	of	law	and	regulation.	Last,	as	was	explained	earlier,	there	are	subjects	such	as	
land-use	 planning	 and	 civil	 service	 law	 that	 in	many	 legal	 systems	 are	 central	 to	 the	 field	 of	
administrative	law	but	are	not	covered	by	comparative	law	and	regulation.		
	
Which	Questions,	Theories,	and	Analytical	Tools?		
 
The	 field	of	 comparative	 law	and	 regulation	 is	motivated	by	 the	 larger	 intellectual	 project	of	
understanding	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process.	 How	 are	 social	 and	 economic	 problems	 like	
consumer	tracking	and	parabens	handled	in	the	contemporary,	global,	regulatory	process?		The	
objective	 is	not	to	generate	a	 laundry	 list	of	regulatory	 law	across	the	dozens	of	national	and	
international	 jurisdictions	 involved	 in	that	process.	Rather,	the	field	seeks	to	develop	theories	
and	analytical	tools	that	 illuminate	the	essential	properties	of	the	global	regulatory	process—
jurisdictional	diversity	and	commonality,	including	both	domestic	and	international	jurisdictions,	
convergence	 or	 divergence	 over	 time,	 and	 prescription	 based	 on	 comparison.	What	 are	 the	
distinctive	public	 institutions,	procedures,	 and	principles	 that	mark	different	 jurisdictions	and	
that	can	give	rise	to	variation	in	the	treatment	of	common	regulatory	problems	across	the	globe?	
What	are	the	political	and	social	processes	that	cause	convergence	in	some	jurisdictions,	with	
respect	 to	 certain	 types	 of	 policy	 problems	 and	 regulatory	 law?	 How	 should	 comparative	
arguments	in	favor	of	law	reform,	a	favorite	rhetorical	device	in	the	global	regulatory	process,	be	
assessed	and	improved?			 	
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The	more	general	field	of	comparative	law	offers	a	good	point	of	departure	for	addressing	
these	questions.	The	field	emerged	in	the	twentieth	century	in	the	context	of	the	globalization	
of	 commerce	 and	 has	 been	 dedicated,	 to	 a	 significant	 extent,	 to	 the	 project	 of	 facilitating	
commercial	 transactions	across	different	 jurisdictions	 (Dubinsky,	2005:	219–20;	Zimmermann,	
2008).	Many	of	the	theoretical	and	methodological	debates	of	the	discipline	have	been	driven	by	
the	 need	 for	 the	 law	 of	 contracts,	 essential	 to	 global	 transactions,	 to	 straddle	 multiple	
jurisdictions.	 Traditional	 comparative	 law,	 therefore,	 serves	 as	 a	 useful	 springboard	 for	
understanding	globalization,	this	time	not	in	the	private	law	sphere	but	in	the	different	context	
of	 public	 law,	 that	 is,	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process.	 Comparative	 law	 has	 developed	 three	
promising	 lines	 of	 theoretical	 inquiry	 for	 understanding	 the	 defining	 features	 of	 the	 global	
regulatory	process:	descriptive	classifications,	causal	transplant	theory,	and	normative	theory	on	
how	to	compare	in	the	service	of	law	reform	and	law	unification,	including	the	functional	method.	
Classification	 schemes	 serve	 to	 capture	 the	 important	 legal	 attributes	 that	 characterize	
jurisdictions	and	to	understand	differences	and	similarities	among	jurisdictions.	Theories	of	legal	
transplants	are	designed	to	explain	whether	or	not	law	spreads	and	jurisdictions	converge.	And	
the	 functional	 method	 provides	 a	 solid	 basis	 for	 evaluating	 and	 improving	 the	 comparative	
arguments	used	by	regulatory	operators	to	recommend	new	law.			
	
Differences	and	commonalities:	paradigms	of	public	law	and	public–private	relations	
One	 of	 the	 classic	 ambitions	 of	 comparative	 law	 is	 to	 describe	 and	 analyze	 deep-seated	
differences	and	similarities	in	legal	systems	across	the	world	(Reimann,	2002;	Glenn,	2008,		2011;	
Pargendler,	2012).	To	this	end,	classifications	have	served	as	an	important	intellectual	tool.	They	
cut	through	the	inevitable	morass	of	details	and	legal	instruments	that	are	required	for	the	day-
to-day	 operation	 of	 the	 law	 in	 any	 particular	 system	 and	 identify	 the	 crucial	 elements	 that	
generate	the	law	across	multiple	jurisdictions.	The	categories	that	constitute	a	classification	are	
designed	 to	 capture	 complex	 patterns	 of	 behavior	 in	 the	 law	 and	 to	 convey	 the	 multiple,	
interrelated	 characteristics	 that	 separate	 some	 jurisdictions	 and	 unite	 others.	 The	 categories	
serve	to	understand	how,	in	some	cases,	similar	disputes	and	problems	can	trigger	different	legal	
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processes	and,	in	certain	instances,	culminate	in	different	outcomes.	Because	they	operate	as	a	
tool	for	understanding	variation,	classifications	are	the	key	to	mapping	legal	systems	worldwide.	
They	 provide	 legal	 actors	with	 the	 intellectual	 resources	 necessary	 to	 navigate	 legal	 systems	
outside	their	home	jurisdiction	and	to	interact	with	the	multiple	jurisdictions	that	decide	their	
legal	problems.		
	 Although	description	and	mapping	based	on	classifications	is	a	major	area	of	academic	
endeavor	 in	 comparative	 law,	 it	 has	 also	 generated	 significant	 criticism	within	 the	 discipline	
(Riles,	1999;	Glenn,	2008).	Classifications	and	their	categories	inevitably	simplify	legal	systems;	
indeed	that	is	one	of	their	great	virtues.	But	with	simplification	comes	intellectual	risk:	that	the	
categories	fail	to	capture	the	crucial	elements	of	legal	systems,	that	the	categories	only	work	for	
some	systems,	that	certain	jurisdictions	are	misclassified,	or	that	it	is	impossible	to	tell	whether	
one,	or	indeed	any,	jurisdiction	should	be	classified	as	belonging	to	one	or	the	other	category.	At	
the	same	time,	classifications	tend	to	be	static.	That	is,	once	a	jurisdiction	is	classified,	there	is	
intellectual	resistance	to	admitting	that	what,	by	definition,	are	the	fundamental	elements	of	the	
jurisdiction	have	changed,	and	that	 it	 is	necessary	 to	switch	 the	classification	and	redraw	the	
map.	 Although	 these	 undoubtedly	 are	 valid	 concerns	 that	 must	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 in	
developing	legal	classifications,	the	conceptual	exercise	remains	an	important	one.	As	long	as	the	
classification	scheme	does	not	claim	to	be	exclusive	or	definitive,	it	can	offer	a	valuable	heuristic	
to	political	actors	and	legal	scholars.		
	 As	explained	earlier,	traditional	comparative	law	is	mainly	preoccupied	with	private	law.		
Thus	it	should	come	as	no	surprise	that	the	principal	classification	in	the	field	applies	to	the	legal	
sources	and	courts	that	are	responsible	for	deciding	private	law	disputes—the	civil	law	tradition	
versus	the	common	law	tradition	(David	and	Brierly,	1978;	Merryman,	1985;	Zweigert	and	Kötz,	
1998).6	In	addition,	a	couple	of	classifications	have	been	developed	to	capture	differences	and	
																																								 																				
6	Although	the	terms	“civil	law	tradition”	and	“common	law	tradition”	are	often	used	in	the	more	general	literature	
to	refer	both	to	private	and	criminal	law,	the	best-known	theoretical	and	historical	elaborations	of	these	categories	
refer	almost	exclusively	to	the	system	for	deciding	private	law	disputes	in	different	jurisdictions.		The	private	law	
emphasis	can	also	be	seen	in	the	use	of	the	classification	in	the	recent	empirical	literature	on	the	effects	of	legal	
tradition	on	economic	and	social	outcomes,	known	as	the	legal	origins	project.	The	project	codes	systems	as	common	
law	or	civil	law	based	on	whether	it	uses	judicial	precedent	or	a	code	as	the	source	of	law	for	deciding	commercial	
disputes	(Djankov	et	al.,	2002:	Table	1,	Description	of	the	Variables;	La	Porta	et	al.,	1999:	231).	
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similarities	in	how	legal	systems	organize	and	resolve	criminal	cases	between	private	citizens	and	
public	 prosecutors:	 the	 adversarial	 versus	 inquisitorial	models	 of	 criminal	 procedure	 (Langer,	
2014);	and	the	hierarchical	versus	coordinate	forms	of	authority	for	civil	and	criminal	procedure	
(Damaška,	 1986).	 In	 constitutional	 law,	 there	 are	 classifications	 built	 on	 categories	 such	 as	
systems	 of	 judicial	 review	 (Ferreres	 Comella,	 2011;	 Stone	 Sweet,	 2012),	 the	 structure	 of	
government	 (Halberstam,	 2012),	 and	 constitutional	 amendment	 rules	 (Albert,	 2014).	 In	
administrative	 law,	 one	 source	 of	 variation	 has	 classically	 been	 traced	 between	 systems:	
adjudication	of	disputes	between	individuals	and	administration	by	a	tribunal	connected	to	the	
executive	branch	in	the	droit	administratif	and	by	the	ordinary	courts	of	law	in	the	common	law	
(Dicey,	1885;	Bignami,	this	volume).		
	 Drawing	 on	 the	 methodological	 debates	 of	 comparative	 law	 on	 how	 to	 construct	
classifications,	it	is	possible	to	isolate	two	important	sources	of	similarity	and	difference	in	the	
regulatory	domain,	across	both	domestic	and	international	jurisdictions.	The	first	relates	to	the	
paradigms	of	public	law	that	discipline	the	regulatory	process	and	the	second	to	the	permissible	
forms	 of	 private	 involvement	 in	 public	 action.	 	 Not	 only	 do	 these	 classifications	 provide	
intellectual	tools	for	understanding	the	variation	that	marks	the	global	regulatory	process,	but	
they	also	can	advance	knowledge	in	the	more	general	discipline	of	comparative	law.	The	familiar	
classifications	mentioned	earlier	presume	fairly	rigid	distinctions	between	the	operation	of	law	
in	the	private	and	public	spheres	and	in	the	various	domains	of	public	law.	A	classification	scheme	
for	an	area	like	law	and	regulation,	however,	must	deploy	categories	that	cut	across	a	number	of	
subfields	of	 law.	To	the	extent	 that	 this	 is	possible,	 it	 suggests	 that	 the	general	discipline	has	
ignored	important	social,	political,	and	intellectual	forces	that,	like	the	activity	of	regulating,	fail	
to	 respect	 the	 conventional	 boundaries	 of	 the	 law	 but	 nonetheless	 have	 had	 significant	
consequences	for	how	the	law	permits	markets	and	society	to	be	regulated.	Likewise,	in	contrast	
with	the	traditional	discipline,	comparative	law	and	regulation	includes	both	the	domestic	and	
the	international	spheres	and	seeks	to	develop	a	theoretical	apparatus,	including	classifications,	
that	encompasses	both.	The	classifications	advanced	below	suggest	that,	at	least	in	this	area	of	
law,	 the	social	and	 legal	processes	of	globalization	have	advanced	to	the	point	where	 it	 is	no	
longer	 intellectually	 coherent	 to	 splinter	 theoretical	 investigation	 between	 the	 domestic	 and	
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international	 spheres	 and	 that	 traditional	 comparative	 law	 should	 seek	 to	 incorporate	
international	jurisdictions	too.		
	 The	 following	 discussion	 explains	 each	 classification	 scheme	 in	 turn,	 illustrating	 each	
category	in	the	classification	with	specific	jurisdictions.	It	identifies	the	different	elements	of	law	
and	regulation—rulemaking,	oversight,	enforcement,	and	 judicial	review—associated	with	the	
categories	and	discusses	the	historical	and	intellectual	origins	of	the	categories.	Mindful	of	the	
critique	of	classifications	in	the	more	general	discipline,	the	argument	is	not	that	all	legal	systems	
can	be	classified	as	belonging	exclusively	to	one	or	the	other	category	or	that	jurisdictions	remain	
set	in	stone	over	time.	The	claim	is,	rather,	that	even	though	jurisdictions	can	possess	a	variety	
of	legal	currents,	some	will	predominate,	and	therefore	it	is	often	possible	to	come	to	plausible	
conclusions	as	to	how	to	classify	the	legal	system.	In	other	words,	even	though	the	classifications	
can	 and	 should	 be	 contested	 in	 particular	 cases,	 they	 remain	 a	 valuable	 heuristic	 for	
understanding	variation	in	the	global	regulatory	process.		
	
Paradigms	of	public	law		Today	there	are	at	least	four	different	paradigms	of	what	is	protected	
by	the	public	law	that	applies	to	the	regulatory	function:	rule	by	law,	fundamental	rights,	ballot-
box	democracy,	and	transformative	democracy.	Although	these	paradigms	are	most	apparent	in	
what	courts	do	and	the	judicial	review	of	regulation,	they	also	shape	regulatory	oversight	and	
regulatory	enforcement.	
Rule	 by	 law	 refers	 to	 the	 classic	 theory	 that	 all	 state	 action	must	 be	 authorized	 by	 a	
written	law	and	must	adhere	to	the	parameters	of	that	law	(Allison,	2007:	157–85;	Krygier,	2012,	
2015).7	This	paradigm	emphasizes	 that	 legal	 certainty,	 rules,	and	 independent	policing	of	 the	
rules	by	courts	are	central	to	the	legitimacy	of	public	action.		The	origins	and	substance	of	the	
law	are	somewhat	secondary	to	the	fact	that	the	state	and	the	bureaucracy	are	made	subject	to	
the	 law.	Historically,	 rule	by	 law	 is	associated	with	 the	 rise	of	 liberalism,	 the	emergence	of	a	
																																								 																				
7	Although	“rule	by	 law”	 is	also	used	by	Tom	Ginsburg	and	Tamir	Moustafa	 in	their	book	on	 law	in	authoritarian	
regimes	(2008),	the	term	is	defined	here	more	broadly	and	includes	some	of	the	core	elements	of	“rule	of	law”	in	
contemporary	western	democracies.		
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private	 sphere	 separate	 from	 the	 state	 and	 in	 need	 of	 protection	 from	 the	 state,	 and	 the	
administrative	law	of	the	nineteenth	century	(Mannori	and	Sordi,	2001;	Bignami,	this	volume).	It	
is	evident	in	classic	common	law	and	continental	doctrines	of	judicial	review	such	as	reviewing	
administrative	acts	for	being	ultra	vires	or	in	excess	of	power	(Bignami,	2011b:	899).			
Although,	today,	rule	by	law	has	been	joined	in	western	democracies	by	other	types	of	
public	law,	it	operates	as	the	primary	form	of	judicial	oversight	in	certain	newer	or	transitional	
democracies	and	even	in	certain	authoritarian	systems.	It	is	associated	with	a	strong	executive	
and	a	relatively	weak	legislature	and	judicial	system,	either	because	of	the	authoritarian	power	
structure	or	because	of	a	strong	civil	service	and	a	historical	legacy	of	one-party	dominance.	The	
latter	is	the	case	for	the	East	Asian	countries	of	Japan	and,	until	very	recently,	Taiwan	and	South	
Korea	(Huang	and	Law,	this	volume;	Ohnesorge,	this	volume).	In	those	legal	systems,	much	of	
the	emphasis	of	administrative	law	reform	has	been	to	strengthen	the	judiciary,	so	as	to	ensure	
that	courts	will	truly	be	in	a	position	to	hold	the	state	to	the	law,	but	the	substance	of	judicial	
review	 remains	 focused	 on	 whether	 state	 action	 is	 authorized	 by	 the	 law	 and	 falls,	 roughly	
speaking,	 within	 the	 parameters	 contemplated	 by	 the	 law	 (Huang	 and	 Law,	 this	 volume;	
Ohnesorge,	this	volume).		
The	 rule-by-law	 paradigm	 also	 has	 traction	 for	 understanding	 developments	 in	
authoritarian	systems	like	China	and	Egypt	(Ginsburg	and	Moustafa,	2008).	While	in	the	classic	
formulation,	rule	by	law	is	designed	to	protect	an	autonomous	private	sphere	from	incursions	by	
an	arbitrary	 state,	 in	 the	 theories	 that	have	been	used	 to	understand	 courts	 in	 authoritarian	
systems,	rule	by	law	can	serve	as	a	tool	through	which	an	authoritarian	party	can	seek	to	establish	
control	over	a	wayward	bureaucracy.	That	bureaucracy	cannot	be	controlled	through	hierarchical	
organization	linking	the	bureaucracy	to	the	authoritarian	party	because	of	the	complexities	of	
modern	 economic	 policymaking	or	 because	of	 entrenched	 cronyism	and	 corruption.	 In	 these	
political	science	theories,	judicial	review	of	administrative	action	based	on	the	authorizing	law	
can	 serve	 as	 a	 substitute	 for	 hierarchical	 control	 (Moustafa,	 2007;	 Ginsburg,	 2008).	 In	 such	
systems,	 judicial	 review	can	also	be	used	 to	 generate	 the	 legal	 certainty	necessary	 to	attract	
foreign	investment	(Moustafa,	2007).		
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In	 jurisdictions	 spurred	 by	 the	 rule-by-law	 paradigm,	 other	 types	 of	 judicial	 review	of	
regulation	such	as	proportionality	are	either	absent	or	relatively	inactive.	Regulatory	oversight	
mechanisms	that	are	designed	to	guarantee	public	accountability	and	fundamental	rights,	such	
as	 freedom	 of	 information	 rights	 and	 independent	 ombudsmen,	 are	 rare	 or	 under-utilized	
(Carmona,	2011;	Jianwei,	2012;	Xiao,	2012;	Chinese	Human	Rights	Defenders,	2014).	Regulatory	
enforcement	is,	at	least	in	theory,	driven	by	the	importance	of	legal	certainty	and	the	need	to	
demonstrate	that	the	law	is	not	arbitrary	but	is	enforced	equally	against	all	private	actors	(Vande	
Walle,	2013:	127–44;	van	Rooij,	this	volume).	The	initiative	rests	largely	in	the	hands	of	public	
actors,	that	is,		criminal	prosecutors	and	administrative	authorities,	as	opposed	to	private	class	
actions,	and	it	can	be	used	symbolically	to	underscore	the	application	of	law	to	all	(van	Rooij,	this	
volume).	
In	the	fundamental	rights	model,	which	is	characteristic	of	many	European	democracies,	
the	role	of	 law	in	the	regulatory	process	goes	beyond	enforcing	rule	by	law.	 	 It	 is	designed	to	
ensure	that	the	state	actors	involved	in	the	regulatory	process―the	legislature	and	the	political	
executive	 as	 well	 as	 state	 administration	 and	 the	 various	 bodies	 responsible	 for	
implementation―respect	a	variety	of	liberal	rights	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	certain	positive	social	
and	economic	rights	(Bignami,	this	volume).		The	fundamental	rights	paradigm	is	the	historical	
product	 of	 a	 strong	 bureaucracy	 and	 a	 centrally	 organized	 state,	 powerful	 courts,	 and	 a	
somewhat	cautious	approach	to	electoral	politics	and	the	legislative	branch	in	the	wake	of	the	
inter-war	experience	with	mass	democracy	and	dictatorship.		
The	fundamental	rights	paradigm	is	reflected	in	doctrines	of	judicial	review	of	regulation,	
which	emphasize	economic	and	social	rights	and	proportionality	balancing	to	set	limits	on	state	
interference	with	those	rights	(Bignami,	2011b:	899–900;	Bignami,	this	volume;	Rose-Ackerman,	
this	volume).		It	is	also	apparent	in	a	distinct	type	of	oversight	mechanism	that	has	mushroomed	
since	 the	1980s:	 independent	ombudsmen	and	government	 commissions	with	 the	mission	of	
safeguarding	specific	 fundamental	rights	 in	the	activities	of	the	state,	 including	regulation	(de	
Beco,	2009;	European	Union	Agency	for	Fundamental	Rights,	2010;	Bignami,	2011a).	Consistent	
with	 the	 historical	 tradition	 of	 strong	 bureaucracy	 and	 distrust	 of	 democratic	 populism,	
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regulatory	enforcement	is	triggered	largely	by	state	actors,	albeit	with	a	much	greater	emphasis	
on	 safeguarding	 rights	 than	 in	 rule-by-law	 jurisdictions.	 In	 legal	 systems	 such	 as	 the	 United	
Kingdom	and	 Scandinavian	 countries,	which	historically	 have	experienced	greater	democratic	
stability,	 the	 emphasis	 on	 fundamental	 rights,	 especially	 as	 enforced	by	 formalist	 courts,	 has	
traditionally	 been	 less	 significant.	 With	 the	 Europeanization	 of	 public	 law,	 however,	 that	
difference	is	fading.	In	the	international	sphere,	with	respect	to	a	limited	set	of	economic	rights	
and	judicial	review,	the	WTO	appears	to	be	adopting	the	fundamental	rights	model.	The	WTO	
agreements	establish	a	number	of	free	trade	rights	but,	at	the	same	time,	recognize	that	national	
regulation	in	furtherance	of	public	policy	goals	is	legitimate.		The	Dispute	Resolution	Body,	which	
has	been	tasked	with	adjudicating	challenges	to	national	regulation	based	on	the	rights	set	down	
in	the	WTO	agreements,	has	developed	a	doctrinal	approach	akin	to	proportionality	that	balances	
public	purposes	against	free	trade	rights	(Shaffer,	this	volume).	
In	 the	 ballot-box	 democracy	 paradigm,	 the	 public	 law	 that	 disciplines	 the	 regulatory	
process	is	designed	to	promote	democratic	proceduralism	(Bignami,	this	volume).	In	legal	theory,	
the	legitimacy	of	state	action	pivots	on	the	democratic	process	and	the	directly	elected	branches	
of	government:	all	state	action	is	to	be	controlled	by	the	legislative	assembly	and	the	political	
executive,	 and	 the	 bureaucracy	 is	 required	 to	 follow	 procedures	 that	 promote	 popular	
participation	 in	 policymaking.	 This	model	 is	 associated	with	 a	weak	 central	 bureaucracy	 and	
executive	branch,	strong	courts,	and	a	stable	and	long	tradition	of	elections	and	legislatures.	The	
United	 States,	 which	 is	 the	 prime	 example	 of	 ballot-box	 democracy,	 is	 characterized	 by	 an	
outsized	 influence	 of	 the	 courts	 and	 the	 adversarial,	 common	 law	 model	 of	 government	
administration.	 	 The	 courts	 are	 tasked	 with	 functions	 that	 are	 handled,	 elsewhere,	 by	
administrative	 authorities;	 when	 powers	 are	 delegated	 to	 administrative	 agencies,	 their	
procedure	is	adversarial	and	judicial	review	is	all	but	certain	(Kagan,	2001;	Morag-Levine,	2003;	
Schiller,	 this	 volume).	 The	 proceduralism	 of	 the	 common	 law	 state	was,	 after	 the	 demise	 of	
substantive	due	process	and	economic	and	social	rights	in	the	New	Deal,	coupled	with	a	vision	of	
public	law	as	a	handmaiden	of	the	electoral	process	and	democracy	(Bickel,	1962;	Ely,	1980).	In	
other	words,	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	contemporary	state	 function	of	 regulating	complex	social	and	
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economic	problems	and	the	contemporary	state	actor	of	bureaucracy,	the	ambition	of	public	law	
is	to	safeguard	the	original,	constitutional	model	of	ballot-box	democracy.		
American	 ballot-box	 democracy	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 doctrines	 employed	 in	 the	 judicial	
review	of	administrative	rulemaking,	which	are	highly	procedural	in	nature	and	are	justified,	in	
legal	theory,	as	a	means	of	ensuring	that	the	administrative	state	replicates	the	pluralism	of	the	
democratic	process	(Bignami,	this	volume;	Rose-Ackerman,	this	volume;	Wagner,	this	volume).		
In	the	regulatory	sphere,	the	best	known	of	these	doctrines	is	arbitrary	and	capricious	review	of	
administrative	 rulemaking,	what	 has	 become	 known	 as	 “hard-look	 review”	 or,	more	 broadly	
speaking,	“proceduralized	rationality	review”	(Mashaw,	2012:	289).	The	corollary	of	democratic	
proceduralism	 is	 relatively	 little	 judicial	 review	 designed	 to	 safeguard	 substantive	 values	
independent	 of	 the	 statutory	 framework.	 The	 importance	 of	 ballot-box	 democracy	 has	 also	
undermined	 the	 emergence	 of	 oversight	 mechanisms	 outside	 of	 the	 tripartite	 scheme	 of	
government,	 that	 is,	 independent	 ombudsmen	 and	 government	 commissions	 tasked	 with	
enforcing	rights	(Grunewald,	1988:	53–55;	Bignami,	2007:	696–97).	In	the	domain	of	regulatory	
enforcement,	the	prominence	of	private	class	actions	as	compared	with	criminal	prosecutions	
and	 administrative	 enforcement	 is	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 ballot-box	model:	 the	 class	 action	 is	 a	
historical	import	from	the	English	common	law	which	has	been	far	more	successful	in	America	
than	 in	 England	 due	 to	 a	 weak	 state,	 strong	 courts,	 and	 democratic	 populism	 (Hensler,	 this	
volume).		
In	 the	 transformative	 democracy	 paradigm,	 the	 law	 is	 conceived	 not	 as	 a	 way	 of	
overseeing	regulatory	institutions,	 including	bureaucracies	and	the	political	branches,	but	as	a	
means	of	supplanting	and	profoundly	transforming	those	institutions.	This	paradigm	is	evident	in	
a	number	of	new	democracies	with	a	history	of	a	weak	or	corrupt	state,	which	in	many	cases	also	
encompasses	the	traditional	 judiciary,	and	a	feeble	democratic	process	(Saiegh,	2010;	Zuvanic	
and	 Iacoviello,	2010;	Francheschet	and	Díez,	2012).	 	Examples	 include	 India	and	a	number	of	
countries	in	Latin	America.		
Transformative	 democracy	 captures	 a	 wide	 swath	 of	 law	 and	 regulation.	 The	 courts	
responsible	for	judicial	review	are	often	new,	as	in	the	case	of	newly	established	constitutional	
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courts,	 or	 newly	 invigorated,	 as	where	 access	 to	 justice	 has	 been	 dramatically	 expanded	 for	
individual	 litigants	 (Smulovitz,	 2012).	 They	 enforce	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 positive	 rights—more	
extensive	than	 in	the	fundamental	rights	model―based	on	the	visions	of	substantive	equality	
and	distributive	justice	contained	in	their	constitutions	(Gargarella,	2006;	Gauri	and	Brinks,	2008;	
Lamprea,	Forman,	and	Chapman,	this	volume).	Although	written	constitutions	in	transformative	
democracies	 tend	 to	 list	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 set	 of	 individual	 rights	 than	 in	 established	
democracies,	courts	are	motivated	as	much	by	the	constitutional	text	as	by	the	need	to	act	in	the	
face	 of	 weak	 bureaucracies	 and	 low	 state	 capacity	 (Lamprea,	 Forman,	 and	 Chapman,	 this	
volume).	Common	oversight	mechanisms,	such	as	transparency,	which	in	other	democracies	are	
conceived	 largely	as	a	 supplement	 to	 the	ordinary	political	process,	 are	used	 for	purposes	of	
subverting	 and	 transforming	 both	 the	 bureaucracy	 and	 the	 traditional	 system	 of	 political	
competition	 (Worthy,	 this	 volume).	 These	 jurisdictions	 are	 relatively	 open	 to	 establishing	
alternative	forms	of	regulatory	enforcement	that	rely	on	private	initiative	(Gidi,	2003;	2012:	901–
39)	 and	 additional,	 non-traditional	 oversight	 mechanisms,	 such	 as	 independent	 rights	 and	
accountability	bodies	(Ackerman,	2010;	Reif,	2011).		
Table	I.2		summarizes	the	categories	of	public	law	and	how	they	shape	judicial	review	and	
other	elements	of	regulatory	law.	
[Table	I.2	here]	
Models	of	public–private	relations		A	second	major	form	of	variation	that	separates	legal	systems	
and	 that	 can	 illuminate	 jurisdictional	 diversity	 and	 similarity	 in	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process	
concerns	the	legal	relationship	between	public	and	private	actors	(Bignami,	2011b:	884–90).	The	
differences	 affect	 primarily	 the	 law	 that	 applies	 to	 rulemaking,	 whether	 by	 government	
authorities	or	by	private	bodies,	but	they	also	shape	regulatory	enforcement.			
By	definition,	regulation	acts	upon	private	markets	to	achieve	economic,	environmental,	
health,	and	other	public	ends.	The	interests	of	a	host	of	market	and	civil	society	actors	are	directly	
affected	and	the	regulatory	process	in	most	places	is	designed	to	include	and	accommodate	these	
private	actors.	Although	the	law	generally	recognizes	that	private	actors	play	a	legitimate	role	in	
public	regulation,	the	role	that	is	carved	out	by	the	law	differs	systematically	among	jurisdictions.	
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In	established	democracies,	there	are	two	major	types	of	public–private	relations	in	regulatory	
law:	pluralism,	the	paradigmatic	case	being	the	United	States,	and	neo-corporatism,	classically	
identified	with	Europe,	in	particular	northern	European	systems	(Schmitter,	1974;	Lijphart,	1999;	
Bignami,	2011b).		
Broadly	 speaking,	 the	 difference	 between	 pluralism	 and	 neo-corporatism	 can	 be	
summarized	as	follows.8		In	pluralist	systems,	private	groups	are	allowed	to	compete	for	influence	
throughout	the	regulatory	process,	whether	handled	primarily	by	public	or	private	bodies,	but	
they	are	not	permitted	to	formally	exercise	regulatory	functions.9		In	neo-corporatist	systems,	by	
contrast,	private	groups	are	often	given	an	official	role	in	policymaking,	both	traditional	public	
regulation	 and	 private	 self-regulation:	 representatives	 of	 interest	 groups	 sit	 on	 government	
bodies	 and	 private	 associations	 take	 part	 in	 state-recognized	 self-regulatory	 schemes.	 This	
organization	 of	 public–private	 relations	 is	 created	 and	 sustained	 by	 the	 general	 principles	 of	
public	 law	 that	 reign	 in	 pluralist	 and	 neo-corporatist	 systems.	 In	 the	 pluralist	 United	 States,	
constitutional	law	constructs	a	fairly	categorical	divide	between	the	public	and	private	spheres:	
private	groups	are	not	formally	allowed	to	exercise	public	rulemaking	powers	(cf.	Volokh,	2014)	
while	at	the	same	time	public	actors	are	heavily	restricted	in	how	they	regulate	the	internal	affairs	
of	private	groups	(Gardbaum,	2003;	Nelson,	2015).	By	contrast,	in	neo-corporatist	Europe,	the	
law	 allows	 the	 line	 between	 the	 public	 and	 private	 spheres	 to	 be	 routinely	 blurred.	 In	
constitutional	law,	this	mixing	of	public	and	private	action	has	been	tested	largely	in	the	area	of	
workplace	 regulation,	 which	 allows	 for	 private	 bargains	 between	 labor	 unions	 and	 industry	
associations	to	supplant	state	administrative	action,	and,	at	the	same	time,	often	imposes	public	
																																								 																				
8	This	classification	is	inspired	by	political	science	theories	of	pluralism	and	neo-corporatism	(Adams,	2004).	It	should	
be	noted	that	the	classic	definition	in	political	science	turns	not	only	on	how	interest	groups	are	 incorporated	in	
policymaking	 but	 also	 on	 how	 they	 are	 organized	 in	 society:	 in	 pluralism,	 there	 are	 numerous,	 relatively	 small	
organizations	while	in	neo-corporatism	there	are	a	few,	broadly	representative	interest	associations.	
9	Political	science	theories	typically	focus	on	the	high-level	politics	of	social	and	economic	policymaking	(Schmitter,	
1974;	Lijphart,	1999).	 In	particular,	neo-corporatism	 is	associated	with	 the	sweeping	 tripartite	bargains	between	
government	and	the	peak	associations	of	labor	and	industry	that	were	popular	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	and	that	were	
designed	to	govern	a	host	of	policies	related	to	the	workplace,	macroeconomic	indicators,	and	the	welfare	state.		
Neo-corporatist	 forms	 of	 interest	 representation,	 however,	 have	 never	 been	 limited	 to	 just	 labor	 and	 business	
groups	or	to	grand	macroeconomic	bargains.	They	extend	to	government	regulation	in	areas	such	as	healthcare,	the	
environment,	 and	 consumer	 policy,	 and	 to	 the	 entire	 sweep	 of	 the	 regulatory	 process,	 from	 rulemaking	 to	
enforcement.		
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requirements	on	the	internal	organization	of	labor	and	corporate	actors.	Perhaps	the	best-known	
illustration	is	the	German	constitutional	principle	of	the	“social	state”	and	the	public	interference	
with,	and	empowerment	of,	private	market	actors	that	has	been	allowed	under	that	principle	
(Kommers	and	Miller,	2012:	659–65).		
Pluralism	 and	 neo-corporatism	 have	 been	 linked	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 theories	 of	 political	
philosophy.	American	pluralism	is	rooted	in	the	notion	that	competition	among	economic	and	
social	 interests,	 free	 of	 state	 intervention,	 results	 in	 stable	 and	 fair	 outcomes,	 and	 that	 the	
primary	 function	 of	 the	 political	 process	 is	 to	 serve	 as	 a	 neutral	 arena	 for	 interest	 group	
competition	(Truman,	1951;	Dahl,	1971;	Tichenor	and	Harris,	2005).	To	single	out	a	particular	
group	 or	 set	 of	 groups,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 public	 regulatory	 scheme,	 would	 be	 to	 unfairly	 and	
unproductively	interfere	with	that	competition.	Neo-corporatism,	by	contrast,	rests	on	political	
theories	 in	which	society	 is	conceived	as	a	set	of	 interdependent	social	and	economic,	and	 in	
some	cases,	territorial	and	religious,	units	(Duguit,	1901;	Laski,	1919;	Romano,	1946;	Hayward,	
1960;	Gierke,	1977).	The	duty	of	the	state,	which	is	interconnected	with	society,	is	to	foster	the	
different	groups	that	constitute	society	and	to	ensure	balanced	representation	of	those	groups	
in	the	policymaking	activities	of	the	state.	The	two	traditions	of	public–private	relations	can	be	
captured	 with	 the	 contrasting	 metaphors	 of	 interest	 group	 competition	 and	 interconnected	
social	solidarities.		
Although	 the	 difference	 between	 pluralism	 and	 neo-corporatism	 may	 seem	 quite	
abstract,	 it	 is	 both	 cause	 and	 effect	 of	 a	 number	 of	 concrete	 aspects	 of	 regulatory	 law.	 In	
American	 pluralism,	when	 administrative	 agencies	 engage	 in	 rulemaking,	 the	 law	 guarantees	
private	 parties	 formal	 equality	 before	 the	 bureaucracy:	 all	 private	 parties	 have	 a	 right	 to	
participate	 in	 the	 administrative	 process,	 through	 notice-and-comment	 rulemaking,	 and	 to	
enforce	those	rights	in	the	courts	(Wagner,	this	volume).	Private,	industry	bodies	also	routinely	
undertake	rulemaking	functions,	but	most	often	in	the	shadow	of	the	law,	in	the	numerous	gaps	
left	 open	 by	 the	 formal	 rules.	 Private	 associations,	 generally	 speaking,	 are	 not	 officially	
mentioned	and	empowered	by	statute	and,	in	some	policy	areas,	they	may	actually	compete	to	
supply	the	rules	for	an	industry.	At	the	same	time,	the	internal	governance	of	private	bodies	is	
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not	regulated	by	the	state,	even	though,	 in	practice,	such	bodies	may	not	be	competitors	but	
monopolists,	 that	 is,	one	powerful	 industry	association	sets	the	terms	of	social	and	economic	
relations	in	its	particular	market	sector.	A	good	illustration	of	this	private	side	of	pluralist	systems	
is	industry	standard-setting	associations,	which	are	private	bodies	that	make	the	rules	for	how	
products	are	manufactured	but	are	not	singled	out	in	public	health	and	safety	regulations	nor	
subject	to	state	requirements	on	who	gets	to	join	and	how	standards	are	to	be	set	(Mattli	and	
Büthe,	 2003:	 23–25;	 Strauss,	 this	 volume).	 	 A	 final	 element	 of	 pluralist	 law	 is	 regulatory	
enforcement.	As	mentioned	earlier,	the	United	States	is	remarkable	in	the	extent	to	which	private	
litigants	enforce	public	 regulatory	 schemes.	But	American	 law	also	 stands	out	 in	how	private	
actors	get	into	court:	if	the	scheme	includes	a	private	right	of	action,	any	individual,	regardless	of	
history	or	organizational	affiliation,	is	allowed	to	bring	litigation	on	behalf	of	the	class	of	victims	
as	long	as	that	individual	can	demonstrate	to	the	court	that	he	or	she	is	typical	of	the	class	and	
that	the	members	of	the	class	are	similarly	situated	(Hensler,	this	volume).	
In	European	neo-corporatism,	the	blurred	line	between	the	private	and	public	spheres	is	
visible	 in	both	public	 and	private	 rulemaking.	 In	public	 rulemaking,	 certain	market	 and	 social	
actors	are	often	singled	out,	based	on	their	membership	numbers	and	their	type	of	constituency,	
to	sit	on	official	advisory	committees,	with	the	aim	of	achieving	balanced	representation	of	civil	
society	in	the	policymaking	activities	of	the	state.	One	prominent	example	is	the	European	Union	
(Smismans,	 this	 volume).10	 The	 law	 can	 also	 empower	 specific	 private	 bodies	 to	 enact	 self-
regulatory	rules,	while	contemporaneously	requiring	that	such	private	bodies	give	other	social	
actors	the	opportunity	to	participate	in	their	work,	hence	achieving,	at	least	in	theory,	the	same	
balanced	 representation	 as	 in	 public	 rulemaking.	 On	 this	 self-regulatory	 dimension	 of	 neo-
corporatism,	European	standard	setting	provides	an	 important	 illustration	(Schepel	and	Falke,	
2000;	Strauss,	this	volume).	At	the	international	level	as	well,	standard	setting	follows	the	neo-
corporatist,	not	the	pluralist,	model:	international	trade	agreements	rely	heavily	on	the	work	of	
																																								 																				
10	As	Stijn	Smismans	recounts	later	in	this	volume,	the	situation	in	the	European	Union	and	many	European	countries	
is	more	complex	than	can	be	related	in	this	brief	discussion.	Advisory	committees,	today,	influence	rulemaking	and	
lawmaking	in	tandem	with	a	more	recent	process	of	public	consultation,	open	to	all.	This	process,	however,	is	not	
pluralist	 in	 the	American	sense	because	 it	does	not	 incorporate	 the	 formal	equality	of	U.S.	notice-and-comment	
rulemaking.	Rather,	in	public	consultations,	government	actors	are	vested	with	considerable	discretion	on	whether	
and	how	to	consult	and	judicial	enforcement	of	consultation	rights	is	minimal	or	non-existent.	
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two	 monopolist	 private	 bodies—the	 International	 Organization	 for	 Standardization	 and	 the	
International	Electrotechnical	Commission—and	the	 two	organizations	are	 legally	designed	to	
achieve	 balanced	 territorial	 representation	 of	 industry	 groups,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 other	
societal	groups	(Büthe	and	Mattli,	2011).	To	conclude	with	regulatory	enforcement:		As	noted	
earlier,	even	though	European	regulatory	systems	rely	largely	on	public	enforcement,	they	also	
allow	the	private	beneficiaries	of	regulatory	schemes	to	sue	corporate	offenders	in	court.	Private	
litigants	in	Europe,	however,	look	very	different	from	class	action	representatives	in	the	United	
States.		In	many	cases,	only	specific	civil	society	associations	are	allowed	to	sue,	based	on	their	
membership	numbers,	organizational	history,	or	other	characteristics.	 	Such	requirements	are	
designed	 to	 guarantee	 that	 private	 associations	 are	 representative	 of	 consumers,	 workers,	
environmental	interests,	or	other	classes	of	regulatory	beneficiaries	(Hensler,	this	volume).11			
So	far,	the	discussion	has	been	limited	to	Europe	and	the	United	States.	The	analysis	of	
public–private	 relations	 in	 the	 law	 of	 newer	 democracies	 is	 more	 complex.	 	 Before	
democratization,	the	countries	of	Latin	America	were	considered	in	the	political	science	literature	
as	belonging	to	the	category	of	“state	corporatism.”	This	was	a	form	of	interest	representation	
in	which,	as	in	neo-corporatism,	relatively	few	interest	groups	and	their	peak	associations	were	
allowed	 a	 prominent	 role	 in	 policymaking,	 but	 in	 which,	 unlike	 neo-corporatism,	 the	
authoritarian	 state	 tightly	 controlled	 the	 existence	 and	 operation	 of	 such	 peak	 associations	
(Adams,	2004).	The	function	of	interest	groups	in	state	corporatism	was	also	somewhat	different	
from	neo-corporatism:		less	than	representing	important	market	and	civil	society	interests	in	the	
regulatory	process,	 they	served	as	a	conduit	 in	the	corrupt	and	clientelistic	networks	through	
which	 public	 jobs	 and	 benefits	 were	 exchanged	 in	 return	 for	 popular	 support	 of	 the	 regime	
(Vellinga,	2004).	Prior	to	the	pluralization	of	electoral	politics,	East	Asian	countries	were	believed	
to	represent	yet	another	form	of	interest	group	participation	in	state	policymaking:	informal	and	
highly	one-sided	involvement	of	powerful	industry	groups	in	the	policymaking	activities	of	strong	
bureaucracies	(Bhatt	and	Kim,	2000;	Ohnesorge,	this	volume).		
																																								 																				
11	As	with	rulemaking,	the	law	in	Europe	on	private	regulatory	enforcement	has	gradually	become	more	expansive,	
and	 now	 contemplates	 a	 wider	 set	 of	 private	 actors.	 However,	 it	 still	 tends	 to	 vet	 those	 private	 actors	 more	
systematically	than	in	the	pluralist	American	case	(Hensler,	this	volume).	
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Since	democratization,	these	political	and	legal	arrangements	are	breaking	down.	It	is	far	
from	clear,	however,	what	is	taking	their	place.	On	the	one	hand,	at	least	in	most	Latin	American	
systems,	 the	 organization	 of	 private	 groups	 within	 society	 has	 pluralized	 immensely	 with	
democratization	and	the	emergence	of	a	vibrant	civil	society	sector	(Avritzer,	2002;	Risley,	2015).	
On	the	other	hand,	the	question	of	how	the	law	governs	private	access	to	public	rulemaking	and	
whether,	 overall,	 that	 law	 is	 informed	by	 a	 competitive	or	mediated,	 i.e.,	 balanced,	 vision	of	
state–society	relations	remains	an	open	one.	The	evidence	is	mixed.	Legal	requirements	similar	
to	pluralist,	American	rulemaking	procedure	have	recently	been	adopted	 in	a	number	of	East	
Asian	jurisdictions,	 including	Korea,	Taiwan,	and	Japan	(Baum,	2011;	Ohnesorge,	this	volume),	
but	without	the	aggressive	judicial	review	characteristic	of	the	American	system	(Huang	and	Law,	
this	 volume).	The	 same	 is	 true	 for	 the	very	different,	 Latin	American	cases	of	Venezuela,	 the	
Dominican	Republic,	Mexico,	and	Brazil	 (for	certain	 independent	agencies).	At	the	same	time,	
many	Latin	American	countries,	including	Brazil,	Colombia,	Chile,	Costa	Rica,	and	Mexico	operate	
with	public–private	consultative	councils,	typically	identified	with	neo-corporatism,	on	which	the	
major	business	associations	are	represented,	as	well	as,	in	a	few	cases,	labor	and	other	organized	
social	groups	 (Schneider,	2010;	Kröger,	2012;	Patroni	and	Felder,	2012).	The	East	Asian	cases	
mentioned	earlier	also	continue	 to	operate	with	 the	 institutionalized	consultation	of	 industry	
actors,	through	legally	established	advisory	councils	which	are	attached	to	different	government	
ministries	and	which	are	responsible	for	different	types	of	 issues	and	policy	areas	(Schneider,	
2010).	What	balance	will	be	struck	between	these	two	forms	of	public–private	relations	remains	
to	be	seen.	
Table	I.3	summarizes	pluralism	and	neo-corporatism	and	how	they	impact	the	different	
elements	of	law	and	regulation.		
[Table	I.3	here]	
Lest	 these	 classifications	 appear	 too	 abstract	 to	 afford	 analytical	 traction	 on	 the	
commonalities	 and	 diversities	 that	 mark	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process,	 let	 us	 return	 to	 the	
examples	of	 consumer	 tracking	and	parabens.	The	paradigms	of	public	 law	are	 likely	 to	have	
profound	 consequences	 for	 the	 path	 taken	 by	 consumer-tracking	 regulation	 throughout	 the	
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world.	 Internet	 companies	 and	 privacy	 advocates	 can	 expect	 judicial	 review	 of	 any	 future	
consumer-tracking	rules	to	operate	quite	differently	depending	on	the	jurisdiction	in	which	they	
find	 themselves:	 in	 rule-by-law	 systems	 like	 Japan,	 a	 limited	 checking	 that	 the	administrative	
regulation	adheres	to	the	letter	of	the	parliamentary	statute;	in	the	European	fundamental	rights	
model,	a	rough	balancing	test	involving	the	rights	to	privacy,	speech,	and	economic	activity;	in	
American	ballot-box	democracy,	a	meticulous	sifting	of	the	administrative	record	to	make	sure	
that	the	agency	responded	to	all	the	objections	entered	by	the	rulemaking	participants;	and	in	
Latin	American	transformative	democracies,	affirmative	guidance	on	how	to	promote	both	the	
right	to	privacy	and	market	freedom.	Regulatory	oversight	of	any	future	consumer-tracking	rules	
will	also	differ:	review	by	independent	privacy	commissions	in	Europe	and	Latin	America;	only	
more	traditional	forms	of	oversight,	such	as	impact	assessment	by	the	executive	branch	in	the	
United	States;	and	relatively	little	oversight	in	Japan.		Although	it	is	difficult	to	anticipate	policy	
outcomes,	 the	 regulatory	 results	may	 also	 very	well	 differ.	 Because	 regulatory	 problems	 like	
consumer	tracking—and	access	to	medicines,	discrimination	in	the	workplace,	and	many	other	
regulatory	issues—pit	economic	rights	against	other	types	of	rights,	the	various	elements	of	the	
regulatory	process	are	likely	to	produce	more	restrictive	rules	in	Europe	and	Latin	America	than	
in	Japan	and	the	United	States.				
The	 implications	 of	 the	models	 of	 public–private	 relations	 can	 be	 illustrated	with	 the	
parabens	example.	In	the	global	debate	over	parabens	safety,	the	divide	between	pluralism	and	
neo-corporatism	 points	 to	 the	 key	 venues	 where	 the	 regulatory	 battle	 is	 being	 fought:	
administrative	 rulemaking	 procedure	 in	 the	 United	 States	 versus	 expert	 committees	 with	
stakeholder	 representation	 in	 the	 European	 Union.	 Bureaucrats	 in	 the	 United	 States	 are	
gathering	scientific	and	economic	data	on	parabens	from	a	variety	of	industry	groups,	research	
institutions,	and	consumer	activists	with	an	eye	to	surviving	a	contentious	rulemaking	procedure.	
European	civil	 servants,	by	contrast,	are	drawing	on	 input	 from	their	committees	of	scientific	
experts,	 industry	 representatives,	 and	 civil	 society	 groups,	 as	 well	 as	 less	 formal	 types	 of	
stakeholder	consultation,	to	determine	the	dangers	of	parabens	and	the	appropriate	regulatory	
response.	It	is	possible	that	these	differences	will	affect	not	only	the	regulatory	process	but	also	
regulatory	 outcomes:	 according	 to	 some	 accounts,	 pluralist	 rulemaking	 procedure	 is	 biased	
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towards	 high-stakes	 business	 actors	 (Wagner,	 this	 volume),	 and	 therefore	 restrictions	 on	
parabens	in	cosmetics	and	other	products,	currently	less	onerous	in	the	United	States,	may	stay	
that	way.	
	
Convergence:	legal	transplants	and	diffusion	
Although	there	are	many	possible	ways	of	theorizing	and	explaining	legal	convergence,	the	field	
of	comparative	law	has	focused	on	one	line	of	theory	building	in	particular—transplants,	as	the	
phenomenon	is	known	in	comparative	law	(Watson,	1974),	or	diffusion,	as	it	is	known	in	a	related	
avenue	of	inquiry	in	the	social	sciences	(Weyland,	2006;	Dobbin,	Simmons,	and	Garrett,	2007).12	
Research	 in	 the	 law	 and	 social	 sciences	 shares	 the	 common	 premise	 that	 legal	 systems	 are	
interdependent	and	that	when	convergence	is	observed	it	can	be	explained,	at	least	in	part,	by	
the	 decision	 of	 legal	 and	 political	 actors	 in	 one	 jurisdiction	 to	 follow	 prior	 developments	 in	
another	 jurisdiction	 (Graziadei,	 2008;	 Simmons,	 Dobbin,	 and	 Garrett,	 2008).	 In	 line	with	 this	
premise,	 scholarship	 in	 both	 traditions	 generally	 employs	 a	 sequential	 conceptual	 scheme	of	
transfer	and	 reception	 (Short,	 this	volume).	At	 the	 front	end,	under	 the	 influence	of	external	
forces,	 domestic	 elites	 make	 formal	 legal	 commitments	 by	 entering	 into	 international	
agreements,	 enacting	 national	 laws,	 or	 adopting	 specific	 types	 of	 legal	 doctrines	 and	
jurisprudence.	At	the	back	end,	entrenched	social,	legal,	and	political	actors	mobilize	in	favor	of	
or	against	the	transplanted	law,	which	is	either	implemented,	modified,	or	sidelined.			
Even	though	they	share	common	elements,	research	in	the	law	and	the	social	sciences	on	
convergence	 has	 also	 been	 driven	 by	 distinctive	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	 concerns.	 	 In	
comparative	law,	the	focus	has	been	on	core	figures	within	the	legal	establishment―judges	and	
legal	scholars―and	how	they	have	drawn	on	foreign	legal	concepts	to	develop	central,	generally	
private	law,	elements	of	national	legal	systems	(Watson,	1974;	Ajani,	1995;	Graziadei,	2003).		In	
other	words,	the	object	of	analysis	has	generally	been	common	law	doctrines	(adopted	by	courts)	
and	civil	 law	codes	(drafted	by	 legal	commissions	and	legislatures	and	interpreted	by	scholars	
																																								 																				
12	For	a	more	thorough	review	of	the	literature,	see	Jodi	Short’s	contribution	to	this	volume.		
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and	courts)	and	how	their	content	has	been	inspired	by	foreign	legal	sources.	The	explanation	
for	this	tendency	to	borrow	turns	on	the	authority	of	foreign	law	in	the	eyes	of	legal	elites	and	
the	relative	insulation	of	legal	elites,	when	formulating	the	rules	that	govern	disputes,	from	the	
conflicts	 and	 scrutiny	 of	 ordinary	 politics.	 That	 foreign	 authority,	 in	 turn,	 is	 linked	 to	
characteristics	 such	 as	 historical	 vintage	 and	 completeness,	 for	 example	 Roman	 law,	 or	
representativeness,	 for	 example	 regional	 or	 worldwide	 trends	 reflecting	 a	 common	 law	 of	
mankind	(Watson,	1974:	52,	99;	Monateri,	1997–1998).		
Turning	to	reception,	comparative	scholars	have	focused	not	so	much	on	the	empirical	
operation	of	legal	transplants	but	on	the	broader	normative	issue	of	whether,	in	light	of	the	deep-
rooted,	complex	structures	of	the	law	and	the	symbiotic	relationship	between	cultural	identity	
and	 law,	 the	 transplant	 phenomenon	 is	 a	 desirable	 one	 (Nelken,	 2003;	 Twining,	 2005).	 In	
traditional	 comparative	 scholarship,	 the	most	 foundational	 law	of	 receiving	 jurisdictions,	 and	
therefore	 the	most	 vulnerable	 to	 the	disruptive	potential	 of	 transplants,	 is	 the	 structure	 and	
content	 of	 private	 law:	 whether	 a	 system	 is	 common	 law	 or	 civil	 law,	 and	 within	 civil	 law	
countries,	 the	 type	of	 code	 tradition	 to	which	 it	 belongs.	 The	 fear	 is	 that	 legal	 concepts	 and	
principles	drawn	from	one	system	may	not	work	in	the	other.	The	field	has	traditionally	been	
divided	into	two	camps:	between	those	who	take	a	relatively	sanguine	view	of	transplants	and	
trust	that	the	borrowed	concepts	will	be	made	to	work	by	legal	elites,	although	often	in	ways	
that	depart	from	their	use	in	the	jurisdiction	of	origin	(Watson,	1974);	and	those	who	point	to	
the	potential	for	transplants	to	disrupt,	and	possibly	undermine,	the	functioning	of	the	law	in	the	
receiving	jurisdiction	(Allison,	1996;	Legrand,	1997;	Teubner,	1998).	In	a	somewhat	separate	line	
of	 research,	 focused	 specifically	 on	 western	 legal	 transplants	 in	 developing	 countries,	
comparative	scholars	have	brought	to	light	the	many	absurd	cases	in	which	transplanted	law	is	
so	far	removed	from	social	practices	and	local	customs	that	it	fails	to	take	hold	and	is	sidelined	
by	other	types	of	rules	and	forms	of	dispute	resolution	(Gillespie,	2006).			
In	contrast	with	comparative	law,	the	typical	object	of	analysis	in	the	social	sciences	is	a	
specific	type	of	regulatory	policy	imposed	by	the	state,	together	with	the	law	underpinning	that	
policy,	 such	 as	 environmental	 law	 (Holzinger,	 Knill,	 and	 Sommerer,	 2008),	 corporate	 taxation	
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(Cao,	2010),	or	the	privatization	of	retirement	schemes	(Weyland,	2006).	The	domestic	actors	
responsible	 for	 policy	 adoption	 are	 generally	 not	 core	 legal	 elites	but	bureaucracies,	 political	
executives,	and	legislatures	that	draw	on	external	sources,	including	international	organizations,	
international	capital	or	civil	society	actors,	and	the	experience	of	foreign	countries.	Significant	
theoretical	efforts	have	been	made	to	identify	competing	explanations	and	different	mechanisms	
for	policy	diffusion	(Maggetti	and	Gilardi,	2015).	In	one	prominent	formulation,	there	are	four	
possible	 causal	mechanisms:	 coercion	exerted	by	powerful	 actors	 such	as	wealthy	 states	and	
international	organizations;	competition	among	states	for	foreign	investment	and	global	market	
share;	 rational	 learning	 from	 the	 policy	 experiences	 of	 other	 jurisdictions;	 and	 emulation	 of	
policies	 that	are	perceived	as	normatively	superior	because	of	 their	prior	adoption	by	certain	
leader	jurisdictions	or	expert	networks	(Simmons,	Dobbin,	and	Garrett,	2008).			
There	is	also	social	scientific	research	on	the	domestic	reception	of	the	legal	commitments	
made	by	policy	elites.	Although	this	 literature	is	somewhat	difficult	to	distill,	perhaps	because	
the	notion	of	reception	covers	a	variety	of	political	and	social	processes	that	must	occur	before	
formal	law	can	exercise	real	traction	over	human	behavior,	one	theme	does	tend	to	emerge―fit.	
If	a	set	of	 legal	rules,	 institutions,	or	doctrines	 fits	 the	domestic	 legal	environment,	 it	 is	more	
likely	to	take	hold	and	regulate	disputes	among	political	and	social	actors	rather	than	be	confined	
to	the	paper	of	international	agreements,	domestic	statute	books,	and	sporadic	court	opinions.	
A	number	of	different	elements	of	fit	have	been	identified:	the	extent	of	overlap	between	existing	
administrative	 structures	 and	 the	 new	ones	 required	 by	 the	 diffused	 policy	 (Knill,	 2001);	 the	
existence	of	domestic	 legal	actors	such	as	human	rights	NGOs	(Koh,	1997)	and	corporate	 law	
firms	(Halliday	and	Carruthers,	2009)	with	a	concrete	interest	in	mobilizing	the	transplanted	law;	
and	the	accessibility	and	comprehensibility	of	the	transplanted	law	to	members	of	the	domestic	
legal	community	by	virtue	of	a	shared	legal	history	between	the	country	of	origin	and	the	country	
of	reception	(Berkowitz,	Pistor,	and	Richard,	2003).		
As	a	first	cut,	the	theories	developed	in	comparative	law	and	the	social	sciences	can	help	
understand	how	law	travels	in	the	global	regulatory	process.	Rules	on	parabens	and	consumer	
tracking	can	sometimes	migrate	between	jurisdictions,	and	the	politics	explored	in	the	legal	and	
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social	scientific	 literature	point	to	possible	explanations	for	when	and	why.	At	the	same	time,	
both	 sets	 of	 literature	 have	 largely	 overlooked	 the	 core	of	 regulatory	 law—not	 the	 technical	
substance	of	parabens	and	consumer-tracking	regulation	but	 the	 fundamental	procedure	and	
principles	 of	 how	 that	 regulation	 is	made,	 overseen,	 enforced,	 and	 reviewed.	 The	 failure	 to	
address	head-on	this	regulatory	law	has	limited	the	ability	of	the	existing	theories	to	explain	and	
evaluate	jurisdictional	convergence	and	requires	a	reassessment	of	the	theories.13		
Begin	with	the	transfer	of	law.	As	explained	earlier,	transfer	is	explained	in	comparative	
law	as	a	function	of	the	perceived	authority	of	the	external	source	of	law	and	in	the	social	sciences	
as	a	product	of	one	of	four,	alternative	mechanisms―coercion,	competition,	rational	learning,	
and	 emulation.	 In	 both	 research	 traditions,	 the	 role	 of	 power	 is	 fairly	 limited.	 In	 the	 legal	
literature,	 power	 is	 largely	 discarded	 as	 a	motive	 for	 contemporary	 transplants	 because	 it	 is	
associated	with	the	military	force	of	nineteenth-	and	twentieth-century	colonization	(Graziadei,	
2008).	In	the	social	sciences	literature,	the	concept	of	power	is	central	to	the	diffusion	mechanism	
of	 coercion,	 which	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 express	 use	 of	 economic	 leverage	 by	 international	
organizations	 and	 wealthy	 countries	 to	 achieve	 policy	 change	 in	 dependent	 countries.	 The	
empirical	work	on	the	causes	of	diffusion,	however,	has	produced	scant	evidence	of	coercion	
(Garrett,	 Dobbin,	 and	 Simmons,	 2008:	 346)	 and	 has	 come	 to	 emphasize	 the	 other	 three	
mechanisms	(Gilardi,	2010;	Maggetti	and	Gilardi,	2015).			
The	 area	 of	 law	 covered	 by	 the	 field	 of	 comparative	 law	 and	 regulation	 raises	 the	
possibility	that	power	may	play	a	more	central	role	in	explaining	legal	transfer	than	is	currently	
acknowledged	in	the	transplant	and	diffusion	literature.	On	the	one	hand,	the	actors	involved	in	
the	global	regulatory	process	are	not	only,	or	even	primarily,	the	judges,	legislators,	and	scholars	
of	 legal	 transplant	 theory,	 sitting	 in	 their	 domestic	 chambers	 and	 deliberately	 and	
opportunistically	 borrowing	 from	 foreign	 legal	 systems.	 They	 are	 also	 bureaucrats	 and	
government	 officials	 engaged	 in	 ongoing	 negotiations	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 international	 regulatory	
committees	 (Hofmann,	 this	 volume;	 Kelemen,	 this	 volume;	 Shaffer,	 this	 volume).	 	 These	
																																								 																				
13	In	this	volume,	Jodi	Short	exposes	another	weakness	of	the	transplant	and	diffusion	literature	in	the	context	of	
the	global	regulatory	process:	the	failure	to	take	seriously	the	diffusion	of	private	regulation	and	to	analyze	how	
private	actors,	soft	law,	and	non-state	mechanisms	shape	regulatory	law	across	multiple	jurisdictions.		
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international	 political	 processes	 produce	 a	 constant	 stream	 of	 harmonized	 legal	 rules,	 yet	
national	 participation	 requires	 significant	 resources,	 and	 therefore	 it	 is	 highly	 plausible	 that	
power	 differentials	 among	 states	 are	 reflected	 in	 the	 rules	 which	 are	 then	 transferred	 to	
domestic	 jurisdictions	 (e.g.,	 Gadinis,	 2015).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	 contrast	 with	 the	 social	
scientific	literature,	the	law	that	is	being	transferred	not	only	involves	the	technical	intricacies	of	
specific	regulatory	policies,	but	also	the	fundamental	law	of	the	regulatory	function—how	policy	
is	made,	overseen,	enforced,	and	reviewed.	To	exercise	clout	on	such	issues,	government	officials	
must	 be	 able	 to	 draw	 on	 an	 elaborate	 doctrinal	 apparatus,	 which	 in	 turn	 requires	 a	 well-
developed	legal	establishment,	which	in	turn	requires	significant	national	wealth	and	power.	As	
a	 result,	 it	 can	be	quite	difficult	 to	disentangle	 the	 rational	 learning	or	emulation	 inspired	by	
certain	lead	jurisdictions	from	the	underlying	condition	of	national	wealth	and	power	(Dobbin,	
Simmons,	and	Garrett,	2007:	455–57).	If	it	is	not	possible	to	develop	reliable,	testable	indicators	
that	can	distinguish	among	these	different	mechanisms,	then,	at	least	for	certain	areas	of	legal	
diffusion,	categories	other	than	power	and	coercion	may	not	be	particularly	helpful.	Not	only	do	
such	 categories	 undermine	 the	purposes	of	 collective	 knowledge	building,	 but	 they	 generate	
significant	normative	confusion,	given	the	quite	different	valence	of	coercion	vis-à-vis	rational	
learning	and	emulation.			
Now	consider	reception.	The	public	law	and	public–private	classifications	advanced	in	the	
previous	section	point	to	important	cultural	and	structural	differences	that	have	been	ignored	in	
comparative	law	and	the	social	sciences.	What	paradigm	of	public	law	or	which	model	of	public–
private	 relations	 dominates	 in	 the	 receiving	 jurisdiction	 may	 operate	 as	 a	 source	 of	 fit	 and	
contribute	 to	 the	empirical	 investigation	of	diffusion.	 To	 illustrate,	 the	United	States	 and	 the	
European	 Union	 may	 forge	 agreement	 on	 regulatory	 policies	 such	 as	 consumer	 privacy	 or	
chemicals	safety.	But	as	long	as	the	two	jurisdictions	subscribe	to	dissimilar	paradigms	of	public	
law	 and	 public–private	 relations,	 those	 policies	 will	 likely	 operate	 very	 differently	 in	 their	
respective	 jurisdictions.	More	 specific	 issues	 such	as	 consumer	 tracking	 and	parabens	will	 be	
decided	 through	 different	 procedures	 and	 public	 institutions	 and,	 in	 all	 likelihood,	 the	 two	
jurisdictions	will	generate	a	stream	of	regulation	that	will	continue	to	diverge	on	the	substance.				
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At	the	same	time,	any	political	attempt	to	alter	this	obstacle	to	convergence—the	basic	
regulatory	law	of	receiving	jurisdictions—triggers	the	normative	debates	of	the	comparative	law	
literature.	 	As	already	mentioned,	 transplant	theory	 focuses	 largely	on	private	 law,	the	divide	
between	the	common	law	and	the	civil	law,	and	the	potential	problems	generated	by	introducing	
foreign	elements,	drawn	from	across	the	civil	law–common	law	divide,	into	what	are	believed	to	
be	 conceptually	 intricate,	 and	 culturally	 important,	 systems	 of	 legal	 authority.	 Research	 in	
comparative	law	and	regulation	shifts	attention	to	the	public	law	sphere	and	provides	evidence	
of	other	culturally	and	theoretically	significant	differences	in	systems	of	law	and	legal	authority.	
The	 countries	 that	 fall	 into	 one	 or	 the	 other	 category,	 as	 those	 which	 belong	 to	 either	 the	
common	law	or	civil	law	tradition,	do	not	necessarily	represent	radically	different	political	and	
social	worlds.		Their	law,	however,	is	based	on	different	historical	and	cultural	premises	as	to	how	
to	organize	 regulatory	governance.	 	As	domestic	 systems	of	 regulatory	 law	 increasingly	come	
under	pressure	to	harmonize	and	globalize,	it	bears	keeping	in	mind	the	historical	traditions	and	
theoretical	commitments	that	underpin	that	 law.	The	most	recent	generation	of	 international	
trade	and	investment	agreements,	some	of	which	are	covered	in	this	volume	(Shaffer;	Yackee),	
contains	elements	designed	either	to	harmonize	regulatory	law,	through	common	standards	for	
rulemaking	procedure	and	other	elements	of	regulatory	law,	or	to	sideline	it,	with	international	
dispute	settlement	mechanisms	that	replace	judicial	review	in	national	courts.	We	take	no	sides	
in	the	normative	debate	on	the	desirability	of	transplants,	which	is	best	conducted	for	specific	
countries	and	specific	areas	of	regulatory	law.	What	is	crucial	to	note,	however,	is	that	regulatory	
law	 is	 not	 simply	 a	morass	of	 technical	 rules	but	 rather	 is	 part	 of	 a	 rich	 tradition	of	 law	and	
democracy,	 and	 therefore	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 use	 the	 analytical	 framework	 of	 transplants	 in	
comparative	law	to	evaluate	political	efforts	at	transformation.14			
Last,	the	field	of	comparative	law	and	regulation	points	to	an	important	site	for	transfer	
and	 reception	 that	 has	 been	 overlooked	 in	 the	 existing	 literature:	 international	 jurisdictions	
(Bignami,	2013:	1321–26).	 	 In	comparative	 law	and	the	social	sciences,	 the	primary	target	 for	
transplants	is	the	nation	state.	International	jurisdictions	are	interesting	only	to	the	extent	that	
																																								 																				
14	See	Nicola	(2015)	for	a	discussion	of	the	normative	stakes	involved	in	the	negotiations	on	the	Transatlantic	Trade	
Investment	Partnership,	one	of	the	most	important	efforts	at	regulatory	harmonization	to	date.	
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they	serve	as	a	conduit	for	transferring	regulatory	policies	to	nation	states.	But	again,	regulatory	
procedures,	 principles,	 and	 institutions	 are	 also	 transplanted	 and,	 unlike	 the	 substance	 of	
regulatory	policy	which	generally	bites	only	at	the	national	level,	this	type	of	law	can	govern	the	
regulatory	 function	 in	 both	 national	 and	 international	 jurisdictions.	 Since	 domestic	 and	
international	 jurisdictions	 interact	 in	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process,	 it	 is	 quite	 possible	 that	
regulatory	 law	migrates	 between	 both	 types	 of	 jurisdictions.	 To	 illustrate	 with	 international	
examples	from	this	volume,	 it	might	be	that	the	law	that	governs	rulemaking	by	international	
financial	networks	 (Zaring),	oversight	by	WTO	committees	 (Shaffer),	enforcement	 through	EU	
composite	procedures	(Hofmann),	and	dispute	resolution	by	international	investment	tribunals	
(Yackee)	 is	 borrowed	 from	 domestic	 jurisdictions.15	 In	 other	 words,	 transplants	 should	 be	
conceptualized	 as	 a	 single	 process	 that	 can	 operate	 in	multiple	 directions:	 	 law	 can	migrate	
sideways,	 from	one	country	or	group	of	countries	 to	another,	downwards,	 from	 international	
systems	to	the	national	level,	and	upwards,	from	national	governments	to	the	basic	operating	
rules	 of	 international	 jurisdictions.	 By	 influencing	 the	 legal	 procedures	 and	 principles	 of	
international	systems,	government	officials,	firms,	and	other	types	of	actors	can	expect	to	shape	
regulatory	output	over	the	long	run	(cf.	Farber	and	O’Connell,	2010)	and	therefore	the	incentive	
to	 transfer	 regulatory	 law	 operates	 sideward,	 downward,	 and	 upward,	 to	 international	
jurisdictions.		
	
Legal	prescription	based	on	comparison:	the	functional	method	
When	regulatory	operators	navigate	the	myriad	 jurisdictions	 involved	 in	the	global	 regulatory	
process,	 they	 do	 not	 simply	 mobilize	 the	 positive	 law	 as	 it	 stands.	 They	 make	 normative	
arguments	as	to	what	the	law	should	be.	In	a	regulatory	process	marked	by	interdependence	and	
globalization,	legal	comparison	is	generally	an	important,	if	not	the	dominant,	argument	used	to	
justify	domestic	law	reform	and	new	international	legal	instruments.	The	resort	to	comparison	is	
a	pervasive	rhetorical	device,	even	though	that	comparison	often	includes	only	the	regulatory	
																																								 																				
15	David	Zaring	and	Jason	Yackee	specifically	consider	this	hypothesis.	However,	the	fluid	institutional	context	and	
the	current	state	of	the	literature	prevent	them	from	coming	to	any	firm	conclusions.	
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actor’s	home	jurisdiction	and	the	law	of	a	second	jurisdiction	that	is	allegedly	superior	or	inferior	
to	that	of	the	home	jurisdiction.				
Although	the	use	of	comparison	as	an	argument	for	law	reform	may	seem	self-evident,	
the	techniques	necessary	to	understand	the	law	of	different	countries	and	to	make	principled	
recommendations	based	on	that	law	are	far	less	so.		Since	the	codifications	of	the	nineteenth	
century,	the	categories	and	concepts	of	the	law	have	developed	within	the	confines	of	the	nation	
state.	 Because	 of	 these	 historical	 and	 cultural	 particularities,	 it	 can	 be	 difficult	 for	 legal	 and	
political	actors,	schooled	in	the	law	of	one	sovereign,	to	travel	intellectually	to	the	territory	and	
law	of	another	sovereign.	There	are	many	possible	ways	in	which	these	borders	can	be	overcome	
and	comparative	analysis	can	be	used	in	support	of	law	reform	projects.	
The	 academic	 discipline	 of	 comparative	 law	 has	 elaborated	 a	 principled	 approach	 to	
comparing	in	the	service	of	evaluating	and	prescribing	law—the	functional	method.		Since	the	
early	twentieth	century,	the	discipline	of	comparative	law	has	been	profoundly	shaped	by	the	
prescriptive	mission,	albeit	almost	exclusively	in	the	private	law	domain	(Zweigert,	1951;	David,	
1955;	Farnsworth,	2008;	Zimmermann,	2009).	Because	commerce	was	global,	there	was	a	real	
political	demand	for	the	comparative	study	of	contract	law	that	could	serve	to	improve	national	
law	 and,	 even	 more	 important,	 could	 create	 the	 harmonized,	 international	 law	 that	 would	
facilitate	 global	 commerce.	 Some	 of	 the	 oldest	 and	 most	 prominent	 institutions	 that	 fund	
comparative	work	are	dedicated	to	the	international	unification	of	contract	law―to	name	but	a	
few,	the	International	Institute	for	the	Unification	of	Private	Law,	the	United	Nations	Commission	
on	International	Trade	Law,	the	Commission	on	European	Contract	Law,	and	the	Study	Group	on	
a	European	Civil	Code	(Basedow,	2014).			
To	do	the	prescriptive	work,	the	comparative	law	discipline	developed	a	series	of	 legal	
techniques,	known	collectively	as	the	functional	method.	Although	there	are	different	types	of	
organizations	and	political	projects	that	can	draw	on	comparative	analysis	to	make	new	law,	the	
most	prominent	traditionally	have	been	domestic	legislatures,	international	treaty	negotiators,	
and	international	organizations.	And	although	the	aim	was	sometimes	simply	to	improve	the	law,	
in	the	overwhelming	majority	of	cases	the	ambition	was	also	to	create	uniform	law,	on	the	theory	
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that	it	would	facilitate	commercial	exchange	and	human	relations	globally.	With	the	functional	
method,	this	highly	ideological	and	ambitious	mission	of	creating	uniform	law	was	converted	into	
a	series	of	routine	steps:	establish	a	common	problem,	shared	by	multiple	jurisdictions,	such	as	
the	formation	of	contracts;	identify	the	legal	solutions	to	that	problem	that	exist	in	each	of	the	
jurisdictions;	 and	 assess	 the	 degree	 of	 similarity	 or	 difference	 that	 marks	 the	 various	 legal	
solutions	 (Zweigert,	 1951;	 David,	 1955;	 Schlesinger,	 1968;	 Zweigert	 and	 Kötz,	 1998).	 If	 the	
comparative	 analysis	 revealed	 a	 common	 solution,	 then,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 law	
unification,	 this	was	 the	 legal	 solution	to	be	recommended	to	 lawmakers	 (Zweigert	and	Kötz,	
1998:	24).	If	it	was	not	possible	to	find	a	common	approach,	or	if	the	goal	was	strictly	limited	to	
improving	domestic	law,	then	the	different	solutions	were	evaluated	to	understand	what	was	the	
“better”	law	to	be	recommended	to	lawmakers	(Zweigert	and	Kötz,	1998:	47).	To	identify	and	
assess	the	law	of	the	various	jurisdictions,	such	politically	driven	comparative	projects	generally	
limited	themselves	to	the	law	on	the	books,	not	the	law	in	action,	and	therefore	they	relied	on	
the	methodologies	internal	to	the	legal	discipline	rather	than	the	empirical	methodologies	of	the	
social	 sciences.	 This	 approach	 to	 comparative	 research	 has	 been	 very	 powerful	 in	 the	 legal	
academy.	 It	 has	 profoundly	 influenced	 the	 contribution	 that	 has	 been	 made	 by	 scholars	 of	
comparative	law	to	political	projects	of	domestic	law	reform	and	international	law	unification.	
With	 the	 globalization	 of	 the	 regulatory	 process,	 the	 functional	 method	 of	 private	
comparative	 law	 can	 be	 used	 equally	 productively	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 public	 law.	 	 The	 use	 of	
comparison,	 as	 a	 rhetorical	 device	 in	 support	 of	 legal	 prescription,	 has	 become	 increasingly	
prominent	 in	the	area	of	regulatory	 law	(e.g.,	Linos,	2013).	The	 legal	techniques	and	research	
approach	of	the	functional	method	should	be	used	to	assess,	critique,	and	improve	comparative	
argument	in	the	global	regulatory	process.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	important	to	recognize	that	the	
functional	method	has	a	number	of	flaws,	which	are	particularly	stark	in	the	area	of	regulatory	
law,	and	which	require	significant	methodological	innovation.	Because	the	functional	method	is	
closely	 associated	with	 the	 political	 project	 of	 international	 legal	 harmonization,	 it	 is	 heavily	
biased	toward	finding	similarity	(Hill,	1989;	Michaels,	2008).	Researchers	are	instructed	that,	in	
most	cases,	the	foreign	 jurisdiction	will	contain	a	 legal	solution	to	the	problem	and	that	even	
though	the	doctrinal	niceties	of	the	legal	solution	might	vary,	the	practical	end	result—who	wins	
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and	who	loses	when	the	legal	solution	is	applied—will	generally	be	the	same	(Zweigert	and	Kötz,	
1998:	39-40).	A	common	legal	solution,	particularly	in	the	international	arena,	is	both	normatively	
and	politically	preferable:	because	it	is	common,	it	carries	the	moral	status	of	universal	or	natural	
law,	 and	 it	 circumvents	 the	 potentially	 contentious	 political	 debates	 on	 which,	 among	 the	
different	laws,	to	pick	as	the	single,	harmonized	law	(Örücü,	2004).	The	desired	result	of	similarity	
can	shape	the	method	used	to	frame	questions,	design	research,	and	draw	conclusions.	For	the	
outcome	to	drive	the	research	design	is	obviously	troublesome	from	a	scholarly	perspective	but	
when	comparative	research	is	so	closely	connected	to	politics,	the	bias	toward	similarity	has	the	
added	consequence	of	legitimizing	the	project	of	law	unification	and	minimizing	the	implications	
of	legal	change.		
To	be	sure,	the	functional	method	does	acknowledge	that	on	some	common	problems,	
there	 are	 significant	 differences	 in	 legal	 solutions	 among	 jurisdictions.	 It	 does	 not,	 however,	
provide	sufficient	intellectual	tools	for	analyzing	the	different	solutions	and	coming	to	principled	
conclusions	as	to	which	one	makes	for	the	“better”	law	(Hill,	1989;	Michaels,	2008).	Two	criteria	
that	 are	 often	mentioned	 are	 doctrinal	 completeness	 and	 legal	 certainty	 (Zweigert	 and	Kötz,	
1998),	but	that	hardly	exhausts	the	list	of	attributes	that	make	law	desirable.	In	addition,	until	
recently,	 the	 discipline	 of	 comparative	 law	 has	 made	 relatively	 little	 effort	 to	 use	 empirical	
methodologies	 to	 evaluate	 how	 the	 law	 operates	 in	 society	 (Hirschl,	 2005;	 Spamann,	 2015).	
Empirical	methodologies	are	closely	tied	to	the	logically	prior	step	of	determining	the	normative	
criteria	that	should	be	used	to	evaluate	the	law	and	select	the	better	law.	Many	laws	have,	on	
their	face,	desirable	purposes	which	are	not	achieved	in	practice	and	it	is	only	through	empirical	
investigation	that	it	is	possible	to	measure	the	gap	between	normative	ambitions	and	practical	
consequences.		
Although	these	shortcomings	of	the	functional	method	have	been	noted	elsewhere,	they	
are	particularly	acute	in	the	domain	of	comparative	law	and	regulation.	While	it	might	have	been	
possible,	at	one	time,	to	minimize	the	political	stakes	in	areas	of	private	law	like	contracts,	that	
is	certainly	not	the	case	in	an	area	like	regulatory	law.	When,	as	with	regulatory	law,	national	law	
is	informed	by	theoretically	and	culturally	important	commitments	to	the	legitimate	organization	
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of	markets	and	democracy,	the	presumption	should	not	be	similarity	of	legal	solutions.	Especially	
in	light	of	the	political	consequences	of	international	law	unification	and	harmonized	regulatory	
law,	comparative	research	should	not	be	designed	to	give	a	false	impression	of	similarity.	By	the	
same	token,	if	difference	is	revealed,	it	is	crucial	to	be	explicit	as	to	what	makes	for	better	law	
and	why.	To	return	again	to	the	example	of	contract	law,	it	is	at	least	plausible	to	take	an	“I	know	
it	when	I	see	it”	approach	to	recognizing	the	better	law:	since	one	of	the	common	purposes	of	
contract	 law	 is	 to	 facilitate	 private	 transactions,	 it	 may	 be	 possible	 to	 use,	 without	 much	
justification,	normative	criteria	such	as	clarity	and	simplicity	to	evaluate	that	law.	In	the	domain	
of	 law	 and	 regulation,	 by	 contrast,	 the	 different	 theories	 of	 public	 law	 and	 public–private	
relations	 caution	 against	 assuming	 agreement	 on	 the	 normative	 criteria	 for	 assessing	 law.		
Instead,	it	is	necessary	to	explicitly	identify	and	justify	why	some	institutions,	procedures,	and	
principles	are	better	than	others.		
To	be	 complete,	 comparative	 analysis	 should	 also	 employ	 empirical	methods	 (Hirschl,	
2014).	Once	the	normative	attributes	of	better	law	are	singled	out,	it	is	important	to	assess	those	
qualities	based	not	only	on	the	stated	purposes	of	the	law	but	also	on	its	empirical	operation.	It	
is	 certainly	 true	 that	 empirical	 research	 can	 be	 time	 consuming	 and	 difficult	 and	 that	 it	 is	
important	to	set	realistic	expectations	for	research	in	comparative	law,	especially	in	the	case	of	
research	driven	by	the	immediate	needs	of	law	reform	projects	(Palmer,	2005:	263-64;	Basedow,	
2014:	857).	In	many	cases,	however,	the	relative	merits	of	specific	types	of	regulatory	law	have	
attracted	sustained	attention	from	legal	scholars,	beyond	the	imperatives	of	the	latest	reform	
project	 or	 policy	 initiative.	 Some	 of	 that	 scholarly	 effort	 can	 fruitfully	 be	 dedicated	 to	 the	
empirical	investigation	of	the	impact	of	law	on	regulatory	politics	and	policies.		
Since	 discussions	 of	 research	 approaches	 and	 methodologies	 can	 be	 quite	 slippery	
without	 concrete	examples,	 it	 is	worthwhile	 illustrating	with	examples	 from	this	volume.	The	
book	contains	 two	chapters	dedicated	 to	assessing	elements	of	American	regulatory	 law	that	
have	been	promoted	as	the	benchmark,	i.e.,	the	better	law,	for	international	legal	harmonization	
and	domestic	law	reform:	the	procedure	that	governs	administrative	rulemaking	and	private	class	
actions	as	a	device	for	regulatory	enforcement.			
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The	chapter	by	Wendy	Wagner	considers	U.S.	rulemaking	procedure.	As	explained	earlier,	
since	notice-and-comment	rulemaking	provides	for	formal	equality	among	private	groups	in	the	
public	rulemaking	process,	 it	 represents	the	pluralist	category	of	public–private	relations.	 It	 is	
often	claimed	to	be	the	better	law,	as	compared	with	neo-corporatist	and	other	forms	of	private	
participation,	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	 extensive,	 and	 formally	 equal,	 participation	 that	 is	
guaranteed	 in	 administrative	 rulemaking.	 Wagner	 subjects	 this	 claim	 to	 thorough	 empirical	
scrutiny,	including	a	large-N	study	of	her	own.	She	finds	that	even	though	the	formal	law,	on	its	
face,	is	extremely	participatory,	the	legal	incentives	created	for	bureaucrats	and	market	actors	
can	lead	to	quite	the	reverse:	high-stakes	industry	actors	are	generally	favored	over	diffuse	public	
interest	groups.			
Deborah	 Hensler,	 in	 her	 analysis	 of	 private	 class	 actions,	 systematically	 reviews	 the	
normative	reasons	why	class	actions	might	be	the	better	 law―efficient	management	of	mass	
claims,	 ensuring	 that	 small-value	 claims	 will	 be	 compensated	 (“collective	 redress”),	 and	
improving	 the	 enforcement	 of	 economic	 regulation.	 	 The	 chapter	 then	moves	 to	 a	 sustained	
investigation	of	the	enforcement	objective.	It	analyzes	the	existing	empirical	data	on	private	class	
actions,	which	include	a	number	of	large-N	studies	on	the	United	States	as	well	as	one	on	Israel	
and	one	on	Australia,	to	assess	whether	private	class	actions	can	effectively	enforce	economic	
regulation.	Ultimately,	Hensler	finds	that	the	evidence	is	inconclusive	and	makes	a	proposal	for	
a	class	action	database	that	would	considerably	improve	empirical	efforts	going	forward.	In	sum,	
these	 two	 contributions	 on	 rulemaking	 and	 regulatory	 enforcement	 adopt	 the	 comparative	
method	proposed	here:	they	isolate	the	attributes	of	law	that,	in	their	view,	make	it	normatively	
preferable	and	they	employ	empirical	methodologies	to	assess	whether	the	law	from	a	particular	
jurisdiction	or	set	of	jurisdictions	does,	in	fact,	possess	those	attributes.			
To	 conclude	 this	 discussion	 of	 how	 prescription	 based	 on	 comparative	 law	 should	 be	
conducted,	it	bears	highlighting	that,	as	with	the	theorization	geared	at	mapping	legal	variation	
through	 classifications	 and	 explaining	 convergence	 through	 legal	 transplants,	 the	 field	
incorporates	both	domestic	and	international	jurisdictions.	In	contrast	with	the	earlier	view	of	
international	organizations	as	merely	instruments	of	states,	the	contemporary	consensus	is	that,	
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at	least	in	the	regulatory	domain,	international	bodies	can	exercise	power	independent	of	their	
member	states	and	therefore	should	themselves	be	governed	by	law	(Alvarez,	2005;	Kingsbury,	
2009;	Stewart,	2014).	In	principle	there	is	no	reason	why,	in	developing	that	law	and	regulation,	
lessons	cannot	be	learned	from	other	jurisdictions,	including	domestic	jurisdictions	(Schill,	2010),	
and,	vice	versa,	why	the	constructive	projects	of	domestic	jurisdictions	cannot	be	informed	by	
the	experience	of	international	bodies	(Whytock,	2004:	191–93).		Certainly	there	are	significant	
differences	 in	 institutional	 and	 legal	 context	 that	 separate	 the	 domestic	 sphere	 from	 the	
international	one	and	that	can	make	it	difficult	to	draw	lessons.	But,	as	revealed	by	the	discussion	
of	reception	in	transplant	theory,	there	are	also	profound	differences	that	separate	national	legal	
systems	and	that	make	it	difficult	for	law	to	travel;	yet	normative	analysis	based	on	cross-national	
comparisons	is	standard	fare	in	the	legal	academy.	Especially	now	that	international	regulatory	
activity	has	intensified	and	a	great	variety	of	international	bodies	have	been	established,	it	has	
become	 increasingly	 difficult	 to	 make	 the	 intellectual	 case	 for	 separating	 international	 from	
domestic	 jurisdictions	 in	 comparative	 research	 aimed	 at	 improving	 the	 law.	 The	 regulatory	
process	stretches	across	national	and	international	jurisdictions,	as	do	political	demands	for	law	
to	govern	the	regulatory	process,	and	the	rigorous	comparison	of	regulatory	law,	wherever	it	is	
to	be	found,	can	assist	with	the	global	project	of	constructing	law.		
[Table	I.4	here]	
Table	 I.4	 summarizes	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process	 and	 the	
corresponding	lines	of	theoretical	inquiry	that	are	fundamental	to	the	field	of	comparative	law	
and	regulation.	It	bears	repeating	that	here,	as	in	the	rest	of	this	chapter,	the	term	“jurisdiction”	
is	used	to	refer	to	both	international	and	domestic	jurisdictions.		
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OVERVIEW	OF	THE	VOLUME	
	
The	chapters	provide	wide-ranging	coverage	of	the	law	of	the	regulatory	function	that	has	been	
identified	as	the	subject	matter	of	comparative	law	and	regulation.	For	purposes	of	clarity,	the	
presentation	of	 the	 law	and	the	organization	of	 the	chapters	move	 from	the	most	 traditional	
venue	 for	 regulating—public	 authorities	 in	 domestic	 jurisdictions—to	 what	 are	 considered	
relatively	novel	regulatory	arenas—private	bodies	and	international	jurisdictions.	The	following	
overview	highlights,	for	each	chapter,	the	specific	regulatory	 law	covered.	 It	also	explores	the	
contribution	made	by	the	individual	chapters	to	the	lines	of	theoretical	analysis	 important	for	
understanding	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process	 and	 central	 to	 the	 field	 of	 comparative	 law	 and	
regulation.	To	repeat:	paradigms	of	public	law	and	models	of	public–private	relations	to	capture	
jurisdictional	 differences	 and	 commonalities;	 diffusion	 and	 legal	 transplants	 to	 explain	
convergence	over	time;	and	the	revised	functional	method	to	improve	legal	prescription	based	
on	comparison.	Taken	together,	the	chapters	demonstrate	the	value	of	establishing	a	research	
agenda	and	creating	a	reservoir	of	knowledge	dedicated	to	comparative	law	and	regulation.	
	
The	Regulatory	State	Across	the	Globe	
	
The	first	section	of	the	book	sets	the	stage	by	surveying	the	historical	development	of	law	and	
the	regulatory	state	in	the	United	States,	the	European	Union,	and	East	Asia.	Since	the	United	
States	did	not	experience	the	massive	expansion	of	public	ownership	and	industrial	planning	that	
was	common	to	many	post-war	democracies	and	has	always	relied	extensively	on	regulation	to	
intervene	 in	markets,	 it	 is	 often	 taken	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 first	 examples	 of	 the	 contemporary	
regulatory	state	(Levi-Faur,	2005;	Yeung,	2010).		Indeed,	in	American	legal	scholarship,	the	terms	
“regulation”	and	“administrative	agency”	are	often	used	interchangeably	with	”administration”	
and	 “bureaucracy,”	not	 as	 specific	 and	more	 recently	established	 sub-types	of	 administrative	
activity	 and	bureaucratic	organization	as	 in	 scholarship	 focused	on	other	 jurisdictions.	 	 In	his	
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chapter	 on	 the	 United	 States,	 Reuel	 Schiller	 identifies	 two	 important	 characteristics	 of	 the	
American	regulatory	state:	the	underdeveloped,	“patchwork”	organization	and	policy	capacity	of	
the	state,	especially	the	federal	state,	and	the	outsized	influence	of	the	judiciary	and	court-like	
administrative	procedures	on	decisionmaking.		Schiller	shows	how	these	qualities	are	related	to	
an	American	ideology	of	distrust	of	the	state,	which	has	its	origins	in	the	introduction	of	wide	
suffrage	before	the	development	of	a	central	state,	and	the	obstructive	institutional	landscape	
of	federalism,	bicameralism,	and	locally	oriented	political	parties.		The	end	result,	he	argues,	has	
been	a	relatively	weak	regulatory	state	with	low	policymaking	capacity.		
As	explained		by	R.	Daniel	Kelemen	in	Chapter	2,	the	rise	of	the	regulatory	state	in	Europe	
dates	to	the	late	1970s,	with	market	privatization,	liberalization,	and	re-regulation	at	the	national	
level,	and,	somewhat	later,	regulatory	harmonization	at	the	EU	level.	Turning	specifically	to	the	
EU,	Kelemen	highlights	three	important	characteristics	of	EU	regulatory	governance.		First,	EU	
regulation	tends	to	be	copious	and	stringent―reflecting	the	standards	of	“strict	regulation”	in	
member	states	such	as	Germany	and	France.	 	Secondly,	to	 implement	and	enforce	regulatory	
norms,	 the	EU	empowers	private	 litigants	and	courts—a	regulatory	style	which	Kelemen	calls	
“Eurolegalism”—and	increasingly	it	also	uses	EU	agencies	to	coordinate	and	mobilize	networks	
of	national	regulatory	agencies.		And	thirdly,	because	of	the	logic	of	the	global	regulatory	process,	
the	strict	EU	regulation	generated	in	Brussels	has	deeply	influenced	the	policy	choices	of	other	
jurisdictions.		
The	section	concludes	with	the	regulatory	state	in	East	Asia.		To	recall	briefly	the	earlier	
explanation	of	the	field,	as	compared	with	Europe,	the	rise	of	the	regulatory	state	in	East	Asia	is	
associated	less	with	a	change	in	what	states	do―regulating	―and	more	with	a	change	in	how	
they	do	it—in	line	with	liberal	democratic	principles.		As	John	Ohnesorge	explains	in	Chapter	3,	
prior	 to	 the	 late	 1980s,	 countries	 in	 East	 Asia	were	 conceptualized	 as	 developmental	 states.	
Although	there	was	little	state	ownership	and	most	industry	was	in	private	hands,	governments	
intervened	heavily	to	direct	investment	and	production	in	strategically	selected	market	sectors	
and	 to	manage	 trade	 and	 capital	 relations	with	 the	 global	market.	 This	 industrial	 policy	was	
accomplished	 largely	 through	 opaque	 networks	 of	 firms	 and	 elite	 bureaucrats,	 with	 little	
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involvement	of	parliaments,	the	courts,	or	civil	society	actors	outside	of	business.	The	political	
changes	 of	 the	 late	 1980s	 worked	 significant	 changes	 to	 the	 institutional	 dimension	 of	 the	
administrative	 state:	 with	 democratization	 (in	 Taiwan	 and	 South	 Korea)	 and	 greater	 party	
competition	 (Japan),	 the	administrative	process	has	become	more	 formal	and	 legalized.	With	
respect	to	the	content	of	state	policymaking,	the	change	has	been	less	pronounced:	the	more	
passive	regulatory	model	of	setting	rules	for	private	market	actors	appears,	as	in	the	past,	to	be	
supplemented	by	a	heavy	dose	of	interventionist,	state-driven	industrial	policy.		
	
Rulemaking	
	
The	second	section	turns	to	rulemaking	and	one	of	the	most	visible	ways	in	which	rulemaking	is	
shaped	 by	 law:	 the	 legal	 procedure	 that	 governs	 public	 participation	 when	 administrative	
authorities	 take	 the	 lead.	 The	 administrative	 authorities	 responsible	 for	making	 rules,	 either	
alone	or	together	with	the	legislature	and	the	political	executive,	are	often	required	by	law	to	
allow	private	parties	to	participate.	This	section	covers	the	pluralist	and	neo-corporatist	variants	
of	rulemaking	procedure	that	exist	in	the	United	States	and	the	European	Union.		
In	 Chapter	 4,	 Wendy	 Wagner	 analyzes	 the	 law	 and	 empirical	 realities	 of	 rulemaking	
procedure	in	the	United	States.	This	discussion	is	also	relevant	for	other	jurisdictions	because	of	
the	efforts	that	have	been	made	to	transplant	U.S.	law,	some	of	which	are	discussed	in	the	last	
section	of	the	volume.	The	chapter	chronicles	the	elements	of	the	pluralist	law,	known	as	notice-
and-comment	rulemaking,	that	require	extensive	private	participation,	 formal	equality	among	
the	parties,	and	government	impartiality.	As	explained	earlier,	however,	Wagner	shows	that	the	
empirical	reality	is	quite	different:	the	pluralist	law	governing	rulemaking	generates	incentives	
that	enable	high-stakes	regulated	parties,	as	opposed	to	public	interest	groups	and	small	market	
actors,	to	participate	more	in	the	rulemaking	process	and	to	exercise	a	disproportionate	influence	
over	 outcomes.	 The	 chapter	 concludes	 with	 policy	 prescriptions,	 inspired	 by	 EU	 law,	 for	
remedying	the	representational	imbalances	in	U.S.	rulemaking.		
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In	 Chapter	 5,	 Stijn	 Smismans	 turns	 to	 the	 law	 of	 rulemaking	 in	 the	 European	 Union.		
Historically,	neo-corporatist	advisory	committees	of	industry,	labor,	environmental,	consumer,	
and	other	societal	groups	were	the	most	important	form	of	rulemaking	procedure;	still	today,	
they	are	central	to	the	regulatory	process,	numbering	well	over	eight	hundred.	Since	the	EU’s	
legitimacy	 crisis	 of	 the	 1990s,	 advisory	 committees	 have	 been	 joined	 by	 additional	 legal	
procedures.	 Some	of	 these	procedures	have	been	 inspired	by	 the	neo-corporatist	 impulse	 to	
privilege	more	representative	groups	in	the	policymaking	process	and	others	have	been	designed	
to	 facilitate	 full	 and	 free	 competition	 among	 all	 societal	 actors,	 more	 in	 the	 pluralist	 mold.	
Smismans	 concludes	 that	 the	 current	 rulemaking	 system	 should	 be	 conceptualized	 as	
“pluralisation	without	proceduralisation”―expanded	opportunities	for	participation	by	a	wide	
array	of	actors	without	legalistic	enforcement	of	procedural	rights	in	court,	as	is	characteristic	of	
the	 American	 system.	 Although	 the	 EU	 system	 suffers	 from	 representational	 imbalances,	
Smismans	argues	that	there	is	no	reason	to	move	towards	the	more	judicialized	American	model	
in	light	of	the	empirical	realities	discussed	in	Wagner’s	chapter.	
	
Oversight	
	
Although	political	and	bureaucratic	oversight	can	occur	at	any	time	during	the	regulatory	process,	
the	law	of	oversight	tends	to	bite	after	the	essentials	of	the	rules	have	been	decided.		The	section	
begins	with	impact	assessment,	which	is	a	legal	tool	for	evaluating	the	environmental,	social,	and	
economic	impacts	of	government	regulation.	As	Jonathan	Wiener	and	Daniel	Ribeiro	explain	in	
Chapter	 6,	 there	 are	 two	 common	 forms	of	 impact	 assessment	 today:	 environmental	 impact	
assessment,	which	is	triggered	by	public	projects	and	other	types	of	government	initiatives	that	
affect	 the	 environment;	 and	 regulatory	 impact	 assessment,	 which	 considers	 both	 costs	 and	
benefits	(generally	economic,	environmental,	and	social)	and	is	applied	to	all	types	of	regulatory	
policymaking.	Both	were	adopted	first	in	the	United	States	and	have	since	diffused	throughout	
the	world,	although	with	significantly	different	institutional	characteristics.	The	authors	point	to	
the	 proliferation	 of	 impact	 assessments	 required	 of	 regulatory	 agencies	 and	 the	 many	
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dysfunctions	created	by	their	overlapping	and	 inconsistent	 legal	obligations.	To	address	these	
shortcomings,	Wiener	and	Ribeiro	call	for	“integration,”	namely	a	single	approach	that	would	be	
triggered	by	the	same	type	of	government	action,	consider	one	set	of	impacts,	adopt	the	same	
analytical	methods,	and	employ	a	single	review	process.	
Chapter	 7,	 by	 Ben	Worthy,	 turns	 to	 another	 important	 form	 of	 regulatory	 oversight:		
transparency	and,	in	particular,	access-to-information	laws	in	the	UK	and	India.	Under	these	laws,	
citizens	have	a	right	to	the	information	held	by	government	bodies	within	a	fixed	time	period,	
enforceable	before	an	independent	body	and	the	courts,	and	government	authorities	have	a	pro-
active	duty	to	disclose	information	to	the	public.	The	right	to	information	has	been	the	object	of	
successive	 waves	 of	 diffusion	 across	 the	 globe	 and	 therefore	 represents	 an	 ideal	 area	 to	
investigate	theories	of	transplants	and	diffusion.	Worthy’s	chapter	reveals	how	reception	in	the	
UK	 and	 India	 has	 been	 shaped	 by	 the	 paradigms	 of	 public	 law	 developed	 earlier	 in	 this	
introduction.	Although	there	are	similarities	between	their	laws,	the	Indian	experience	has	been	
marked	by	the	transformative	democracy	paradigm.		In	contrast	with	the	UK,	where	freedom-of-
information	legislation	was	but	one	piece	of	a	larger	package	of	modernization	reforms,	in	India	
it	was	 framed	as	a	 revolutionary	moment	 that	would	 transform	a	corrupt	administration	and	
open	up	political	participation	to	excluded	social	and	economic	groups.		The	track	record	on	the	
ground	also	reflects	the	different	paradigms	of	public	law.	In	the	UK,	a	wide	range	of	civil	society	
actors	make	use	of	the	law,	including	business	and	the	press,	and	implementation	has	been	fairly	
smooth.	 By	 contrast,	 in	 India	 the	 social	 justice	 and	 anti-corruption	 campaigners	who	 are	 the	
heaviest	users	of	the	law	routinely	clash	with	a	feudal	bureaucracy	over	compliance.	The	conflict	
between	 the	 bureaucracy	 and	 the	 public	 has	 been	 quite	 dramatic,	with	 reports	 of	 pervasive	
intimidation	and	violence.	
	
Enforcement	
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The	next	stage	of	the	regulatory	process	is	enforcement.	This	section	considers	two	important	
types	 of	 regulatory	 law	 that	 bite	 at	 this	 stage:	 the	 powers	 and	 procedures	 available	 to	
administrative	officials	and	criminal	prosecutors	to	enforce	regulation;	and	class	action	litigation	
brought	by	the	private	beneficiaries	of	public	regulatory	schemes.		
In	Chapter	8,	Benjamin	van	Rooij	considers	administrative	and	criminal	enforcement	in	
China.	He	focuses	on	what	he	calls	the	“campaign	enforcement	style,”	an	institutional	and	legal	
device	that	in	recent	years	has	been	deployed	in	a	wide	array	of	policy	areas,	including	intellectual	
property,	food	safety,	and	employment	and	labor	law.		Enforcement	campaigns	are	triggered	by	
widely	publicized	episodes	of	policy	failure	that	prompt	the	political	leadership	to	take	action	and	
assert	 control	 over	 the	 bureaucracy.	 They	 involve	 a	 radical,	 brief	 change	 in	 China’s	 standard	
enforcement	style—lax	and	captured	by	industry—in	which	regulators	resort	to	more	formal	and	
punitive	tactics.	In	van	Rooij’s	account,	the	campaign	enforcement	style	is	a	product	of	the	rule-
by-law	 paradigm	 advanced	 earlier	 in	 this	 introduction:	 in	 the	 Chinese	 authoritarian	 system,	
enforcement	 campaigns	 are	 designed	 to	 establish	 rational	 bureaucratic	 authority,	 through	
enhanced	hierarchical	control,	and	to	demonstrate	a	commitment	to	the	 letter	of	the	 law,	by	
vigorously	applying	the	law	to	all	private	actors.	At	the	same	time,	enforcement	campaigns	also	
represent	a	form	of	authoritarian	populism,	deployed	to	demonstrate	state	responsiveness	to	
the	 public	 and	 to	maintain	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 Communist	 Party.	 	 Van	 Rooij	 concludes	 by	
observing	 the	 use	 of	 similar	 enforcement	 campaigns	 to	 respond	 to	 policy	 failures	 and	 public	
outcry	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 Netherlands.	 The	 pervasiveness	 of	 the	 phenomenon	
underscores	that	the	law	of	regulatory	enforcement	is	driven	as	much	by	the	theoretical	concern	
for	policy	effectiveness	as	by	the	political	desire	for	popular	 legitimacy	and	authority,	even	 in	
systems	that	afford	greater	protection	for	the	fundamental	rights	of	defendants.		
Chapter	9,	by	Deborah	Hensler,	analyzes	private	class	actions,	a	procedural	device	that	
allows	one	party	to	come	forward	and	represent	similarly	situated	others	(“the	class”)	in	litigation	
to	 obtain	 relief	 from	 regulatory	 harms.	 Although	 class	 actions	 now	 exist	 in	 over	 twenty-five	
countries,	Hensler	reveals	the	considerable	differences	 in	their	precise	 legal	form,	which	have	
limited	their	availability	in	some	jurisdictions	and	have	influenced	the	types	of		private	parties	
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that	are	allowed	to	come	forward	and	represent	the	class.	As	discussed	above,	Hensler	reviews	
the	substantial,	but	as	it	turns	out,	inconclusive	empirical	evidence	on	the	effectiveness	of	class	
actions,	and	puts	forward	a	research	agenda	for	improving	our	knowledge	of	class	actions.	She	
also	argues	that	in	view	of	the	well-known	failures	of	public	enforcement,	policymakers	should	
build	“redundancy”	into	their	systems	and	create	and	preserve	the	private	enforcement	track	as	
a	complement	to	the	public	one.	
	
Judicial	Review	
	
Courts	are	omnipresent	in	regulatory	law	because	of	their	role	in	both	oversight	and	enforcement	
and	because	much	of	the	legal	framework	that	guides	the	regulatory	process	has	been	developed	
in	their	jurisprudence,	not	in	the	formal	text	of	legislation	and	constitutions.		Most	commonly,	
however,	courts	intervene	at	the	end	of	the	regulatory	process,	in	applications	for	judicial	review	
of	the	rules	or	in	defenses	against	enforcement	actions.	The	chapters	in	this	section	illustrate	the	
different	paradigms	of	public	law	developed	earlier	in	this	introduction,	which	are	most	apparent	
in	doctrines	of	judicial	review.	
In	 Chapter	 10,	 I	 	 analyze	 the	 classifications	 used	 in	 the	 scholarly	 literature	 to	 capture	
variation	 in	 judicial	 review	 of	 government	 policymaking	 in	 Europe	 and	 the	 United	 States.	
Although	these	taxonomies	apply	to	 judicial	review	of	the	administrative	state	 in	general,	 the	
chapter	 also	 draws	 out	 their	 implications	 for	 the	 regulatory	 function.	 The	 earliest,	 and	 still	
relevant,	divide	is	between	judicial	review	of	administrative	action	by	the	ordinary	courts	in	the	
English	common	law	and	by	a	special	body	(Conseil	d’Etat)	connected	to	the	executive	branch	in	
the	French	droit	administratif.		Almost	a	century	after	this	first	classification,	Robert	Kagan	and	
others	 drew	 attention	 to	 the	 contrast	 between	 the	 litigious	 and	 formal	 American	 system	 of	
policymaking	and	the	informal	and	discretionary	European	process.	The	chapter	then	proposes	
the	fundamental	rights	and	ballot-box	democracy	paradigms	of	public	law.	In	Europe,	the	courts	
employ	doctrines	such	as	proportionality	and	equality	to	protect	economic	and	social	rights	in	
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government	policymaking;	in	the	United	States,	they	impose	extensive	procedural	requirements	
on	the	bureaucracy	to	promote	pluralistic	democracy	within	public	administration.	In	light	of	the	
potential	for	diffusion,	the	chapter	argues	that	it	will	be	important	to	develop	a	research	agenda	
to	investigate	empirically	the	effects	of	the	two	forms	of	judicial	review	on	social	and	economic	
policymaking.	
In	Chapter	11,	Cheng-Yi	Huang	and	David	Law	turn	to	 judicial	 review	of	administrative	
action	in	East	Asia.	They	first	present	the	rule-by-law	paradigm	that	was	historically	dominant,	
and	 continues	 to	 figure	prominently,	 in	 the	 law	of	 Japan,	Korea,	 and	Taiwan―judicial	 review	
focused	on	the	formal	legality	of	whether	administrative	action	respects	the	boundaries	set	down	
by	law.		The	contribution	then	analyzes	the	variable	reception	of	the	doctrine	of	proportionality,	
drawn	 from	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 model	 and	 used	 by	 East	 Asian	 courts	 to	 scrutinize	 the	
substance	of	administrative	determinations.	Huang	and	Law	observe	that	proportionality	has	had	
considerably	more	traction	in	Korea	and	Taiwan	than	in	Japan	and	China.	Part	of	the	explanation	
for	 this	 variation,	 they	 suggest,	 is	 the	presence	of	 relatively	new	and	powerful	 constitutional	
courts	 in	 Korea	 and	 Taiwan.	 These	 new	 constitutional	 courts	 have	 sought	 to	 establish	 their	
legitimacy	 by	 adopting	 what	 has	 emerged	 as	 the	 gold	 standard	 for	 constitutional	 review	
throughout	the	world,	namely,	proportionality.	At	the	same	time,	even	in	Korea	and	Taiwan,	the	
reception	of	proportionality	has	not	been	complete	since	in	both	jurisdictions	a	separate	set	of	
courts	has	traditionally	been	responsible	for	reviewing	administrative	action;	these	courts	have	
been	resistant	to	proportionality	and	have	continued	to	adjudicate	in	the	mold	of	rule	by	law.		
In	 Chapter	 12,	 Everaldo	 Lamprea,	 Lisa	 Forman,	 and	 Audrey	 R.	 Chapman	 analyze	 the	
operation	 of	 the	 transformative	 democracy	 paradigm	 in	 Colombia,	 specifically	 constitutional	
review	of	 healthcare	 regulation.	 Like	many	 other	 relatively	 new	democracies,	 the	 Colombian	
Constitution	 of	 1991	 contains	 a	 comprehensive	 set	 of	 positive	 social	 and	 economic	 rights,	
including	the	right	to	health,	and	establishes	an	expansive	system	of	constitutional	adjudication,	
in	which	 it	 is	 easy	 for	 individuals	 to	 bring	 constitutional	 complaints	 (tutela).	 	 As	 the	 chapter	
explains,	 implementation	of	Colombia’s	new	healthcare	system,	 introduced	 in	the	1990s,	was	
extremely	problematic	because	of	low	administrative	capacity	and	therefore	patients	turned,	in	
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the	hundreds	of	thousands,	to	the	courts	based	on	their	constitutional	right	to	health.	In	2008,	
the	Constitutional	Court	sought	to	address	some	of	the	systemic	failures	of	the	healthcare	system	
(and	stem	the	rising	tide	of	litigation)	with	a	landmark	decision	(T-760)	that	outlined	a	number	of	
structural	reforms	for	government	policymakers.	It	also	created	a	monitoring	process,	led	by	a	
specially	created	follow-up	panel	of	the	Court.	Overall,	the	chapter’s	assessment	is	positive:	the	
remedies	ordered	by	the	Constitutional	Court	allowed	for	considerable	government	discretion;	
civil	 society	 actors	 were	 called	 upon	 to	 participate;	 and	 the	 process	 resulted	 in	 concrete	
improvements	 to	 the	 healthcare	 system	 that	 very	 likely	 would	 not	 have	 been	 made	 in	 the	
absence	of	constitutional	law	and	judicial	review.	
This	 section	 concludes	with	 Chapter	 13	 by	 Susan	 Rose-Ackerman,	 Stefanie	 Egidy,	 and	
James	Fowkes.		They	analyze	judicial	review	in	the	United	States,	Germany,	South	Africa,	and	the	
European	Union,	 both	 judicial	 review	 of	 the	 rules	 adopted	 by	 administrative	 authorities	 and	
those	adopted	by	legislative	assemblies.	The	chapter	argues	in	favor	of	judicial	review	designed	
to	promote	democratic	participation	in	generating	the	rules,	reflecting	to	some	extent	U.S.	law	
for	administrative	rulemaking	and	South	African	 law	for	 legislative	rulemaking.	The	analysis	 is	
heavily	informed	by	positive	political	theory,	which	focuses	on	the	strategic	incentives	of	political	
actors,	and,	in	the	comparative	context,	on	how	those	incentives	differ	between	parliamentary	
and	presidential	systems.	The	chapter	highlights	how	political	actors	 in	both	types	of	systems	
resist	democracy-enhancing	judicial	review.	It	also	argues	that,	relative	to	parliamentary	systems,	
judicial	 review	 of	 legislative	 rulemaking	 should	 be	 somewhat	 less	 demanding	 in	 the	 U.S.	
presidential	system	because	of	the	inevitably	piecemeal	nature	of	legislation	when	the	executive	
branch,	i.e.,	the	President	and	the	bureaucracy,	plays	a	relatively	minor	role	in	legislative	drafting.		
	
Private	Regulation	and	New	Governance	
	
Although	 private	 bodies	 have	 always	 undertaken	 regulatory	 functions,	 in	 lieu	 of	 public	
institutions,	they	have	become	more	important	since	the	1990s	with	the	growing	popularity	of	
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new	governance	regulatory	techniques.	In	contrast	with	the	classic	model	of	prescriptive	rules	
enforced	by	government	agencies,	new	governance	tools	are	generally	highly	flexible	and	vest	
significant	initiative	and	power	in	private	actors.	This	volume	considers	three	prominent	forms	
of	new	governance—industry	standard	setting,	performance-based	regulation,	and	private	codes	
of	 conduct—which	 empower	 three	 categories	 of	 business	 actors—industry	 associations,	
individual	 firms,	 and	 multinational	 corporations.	 The	 contributions	 also	 highlight	 different	
aspects	 of	 the	 regulatory	 process	 that	 can	 be	 handled	 by	 private	 bodies:	 rulemaking	 in	 the	
chapters	on	standard	setting	and	performance-based	regulation	and	enforcement	in	the	chapter	
on	private	codes	of	conduct.		
	In	 Chapter	 14,	 Peter	 Strauss	 chronicles	 the	 extensive	 reliance,	 in	 both	 U.S.	 and	 EU	
regulation,	on	the	private	technical	standards	set	by	industry	associations.		Strauss	reviews	some	
of	the	differences,	along	the	lines	of	the	neo-corporatist	and	pluralist	models,	that	separate	how	
private	 industry	 associations	 are	 regulated	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 U.S.	 The	 bulk	 of	 the	 chapter	
addresses	the	troublesome	practice,	in	U.S.	regulation,	of	incorporating	by	reference,	and	making	
binding,	the	technical	standards	set	by	industry	organizations,	even	though	those	standards	are	
protected	by	copyright	and	must	be	purchased	from	the	relevant	industry	organization.	This	lack	
of	transparency,	or	“secret	law”	as	Strauss	calls	it,	generates	significant	accountability	problems	
and,	for	a	possible	fix,	the	chapter	looks	to	the	EU.		There	the	law	requires	that	the	“essential	
requirements”	 of	 standards	 be	 stated	 on	 the	 face	 of	 the	 regulation	 and	 industry	 technical	
standards	are	considered	soft,	not	binding,	law,	meaning	that	compliance	with	such	standards	is	
but	one	way	of	demonstrating	compliance	with	the	“essential	requirements.”	To	restate	in	the	
language	 of	 the	 functional	method	 discussed	 above,	 Strauss	 argues	 that	 the	 EU	 approach—
essential	requirements	plus	soft	law	standards―is	the	better	solution	to	the	common	problem	
of	copyright-protected	industry	standards.	In	his	view,	this	better	solution	offers	a	possibility	for	
improving	U.S.	law.	
Chapter	15,	by	Cary	Coglianese,	systematically	assesses	performance-based	regulation,	a	
darling	of	 regulatory	 reformers	across	 the	world.	Performance-based	regulation	works	not	by	
specifying	the	means	of	compliance,	but	rather	by	requiring	particular	performance	or	outcome	
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goals.	The	idea	is	that	regulated	firms	will	determine	for	themselves	how	to	achieve	those	goals.	
Based	 on	 the	 American	 experience,	 Coglianese	 assesses	 the	 merits	 of	 performance-based	
regulation	and	argues	that	it	can	be	superior	to	classic	command-and-control	regulation	but	only	
under	a	particular,	and	by	no	means	universal,	set	of	circumstances:		when	the	policy	problem	
and	regulatory	capacity	are	such	that	firm	performance	is	likely	to	be	assessed	accurately	and	
when	the	regulated	industry	is	relatively	heterogeneous.		In	such	cases,	the	sector	can	adapt	to	
performance-based	goals	in	different	ways,	perhaps	promoting	innovation,	and	at	the	same	time	
regulators	can	evaluate	whether	those	goals	have	been	met	and	compliance	has	been	achieved.		
Chapter	16	on	private	transnational	regulation,	by	Jodi	Short,	serves	as	a	bridge	between	
the	part	of	the	volume	focused	on	private	bodies	and	the	part	dedicated	to	international	regimes.		
The	chapter	highlights	recent	empirical	research	on	one	important	facet	of	transnational	private	
regulation:		codes	of	conduct	that	are	used	by	multinational	corporations	to	set	labor	standards	
for	their	supply	chain	factories	and	that	are	enforced,	at	least	in	part,	by	private	auditing	firms.	
In	 a	 recent,	 large-N	 study,	 Short	 and	 her	 co-authors	 demonstrate	 that	 compliance	 with	
transnational	labor	standards―to	refer	back	to	the	earlier	discussion,	the	domestic	reception	of	
transplanted	 law―varies	systematically	across	national	 jurisdictions.	 In	particular,	 four	factors	
contribute	 to	 compliance:	 ratification	of	 ILO	 conventions	 by	 the	 state	 in	which	 the	 factory	 is	
located;	highly	protective	domestic	 labor	regulation;	high	 levels	of	press	freedom;	and,	 in	the	
buyer	 markets	 served	 by	 the	 multinational	 corporation,	 a	 wealthy	 and	 socially	 conscious	
consumer	 base.	 As	 Short	 argues,	 this	 and	 other	 research	 on	 private	 transnational	 regulation	
makes	an	important	contribution	to	the	comparative	law	theory	of	transplants.	The	transplant	
literature	has	traditionally	focused	on	diffusion	of	formal	law	by	state	actors,	not	the	increasingly	
important	phenomenon	of	diffusion	of	self-regulatory	norms	by	private	actors.	It	has	also	failed	
to	investigate	through	large-N	studies	the	implementation	and	effectiveness	of	legal	transplants.		
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International	Jurisdictions	
	
The	 last	 section	of	 the	volume	 is	dedicated	 to	 international	 regulatory	 systems.	 International	
jurisdictions	have	come	to	function	increasingly	as	independent	sites	of	regulatory	power	that	
interface	 with	 domestic	 jurisdictions	 and	 other	 international	 bodies	 in	 the	 global	 regulatory	
process.	 Depending	 on	 the	 system,	 international	 bodies	 can	 intervene	 at	 any	 stage	 of	 the	
regulatory	 process—rulemaking,	 oversight,	 enforcement,	 and	 judicial	 review.	 International	
jurisdictions	 vary	 considerably,	 both	 in	 the	 scope	 of	 their	 powers	 and	 their	 degree	 of	 legal	
formality,	and	this	section	is	designed	to	include	a	representative	subset.		
In	Chapter	17,	Gregory	Shaffer	develops	a	novel	analytical	framework	for	understanding	
the	 interplay	between	domestic	 jurisdictions	and	the	World	Trade	Organization.	 	The	chapter	
proposes	a	four-part	scheme,	supported	by	numerous	examples,	for	understanding	and	assessing	
the	impact	of	the	WTO	on	national	regulatory	governance:	(1)	changes	in	the	boundary	between	
market	 and	 state	 through	 the	 liberalization	 of	 markets	 and	 the	 reconfiguration	 of	 national	
regulation;	(2)	a	shift	in	the	balance	of	institutional	power	in	favor	of	administrative	and	judicial	
actors;	(3)	the	creation	of	new	professions,	primarily	legal	and	economic,	that	work	with	the	new	
WTO	rules	and	promote	the	WTO	agenda;	and	(4)	the	spread	of	free	market	normative	frames	
that	shape	national	perceptions	of	permissible	and	appropriate	policy	options.	To	return	to	causal	
theories	 of	 diffusion,	 the	 WTO	 illustrates	 a	 number	 of	 different	 mechanisms	 by	 which	
international	jurisdictions	transfer	law	to	participating	states,	including	power	as	highlighted	in	
the	previous	 discussion.	 The	WTO’s	 eighteen	multilateral	 agreements	 on	 issues	 ranging	 from	
customs	inspections	to	food	safety	are	implemented	by	the	Dispute	Settlement	Body	and	over	
seventy	multilateral	committees,	which	meet,	according	to	conservative	estimates,	over	1,000	
times	per	year.	Participating	effectively,	not	to	mention	just	showing	up,	requires	considerable	
resources	and	systematically	disadvantages	smaller	developing	countries.	At	the	same	time,	the	
type	 of	 regulation	 that	 diffuses	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 ultra-liberal,	 deregulatory	 law	 that	 is	
associated	with	power	in	certain	accounts	of	globalization.	Rather,	as	Shaffer	explains,	because	
the	governments	and	firms	that	exercise	power	in	the	global	regulatory	process	generally	come	
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from	wealthy,	high-regulation	jurisdictions,	they	have	significant	strategic	 incentives	to	export	
those	high	regulatory	standards	to	other	jurisdictions.	For	instance,	they	can	push	for	western	
product	 standards	 in	 international	 committees	 or	 they	 can	 provide	 technical	 assistance	 to	
developing	countries	to	support	protective	regulatory	schemes.	The	importance	of	the	potential	
“race	to	the	top”	in	global	regulation	is	underscored	in	the	earlier	chapters	by	Kelemen	and	Short,	
which	reveal	similar	pro-regulatory	mechanisms	at	work	in	the	European	Union	and	multinational	
corporate	codes.		
In	Chapter	18,	Jason	Yackee	turns	to	international	investment	law	and	conducts	a	wide-
ranging	 analysis	 of	 how	 this	 international	 system	 interacts	with	 domestic	 jurisdictions	 in	 the	
global	 regulatory	 process.	 As	 Yackee	 explains,	 bilateral	 investment	 treaties	 (and	 investment	
chapters	 in	 bilateral	 and	 multilateral	 trade	 agreements)	 generally	 protect	 foreign	 investors	
against	expropriations	and	regulatory	takings	by	establishing	principles	of	non-discrimination	and	
fair	treatment	and	by	giving	foreign	investors	the	right	to	sue	states	in	ad	hoc	arbitral	tribunals.	
In	 recent	 years,	 investment	 treaties	 have	 also	 been	 used	 by	 the	 United	 States	 to	 transplant	
administrative	 law	 to	other	 countries,	 in	particular	 the	pluralist	 rulemaking	procedure	 that	 is	
considered	 earlier	 in	 the	 volume.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 potentially	 far-reaching	
consequences	of	 investor–state	dispute	resolution	for	domestic	regulation,	there	have	been	a	
number	 of	 constructive	 efforts	 to	 design	 a	 better	 legal	 framework	 for	 international	 arbitral	
tribunals.	These	include	enhanced	transparency	and	third-party	participation	in	investor–state	
arbitrations.	 Overall,	 Yackee	 is	 cautious	 in	 his	 assessment	 of	 these	 many	 developments.	
Domestically,	 because	 of	 the	 legal	 obstacles	 to	 reception	 noted	 earlier,	 he	 is	 skeptical	 that	
rulemaking	 procedure	will	 operate	 as	 intended.	 Internationally,	 the	 international	 investment	
regime	is	characterized	by	a	relatively	low	level	of	institutionalization	and	therefore	investors	and	
states	can	fairly	easily	circumvent	any	unwelcome	legal	requirements	that	emerge	in	investor–
state	arbitration.		
The	volume	then	presents	one	of	the	leading	examples	of	an	informal,	but	nevertheless	
highly	 powerful,	 international	 regulatory	 regime:	 international	 financial	 networks.	 As	 David	
Zaring	explains	in	Chapter	19,	international	networks	of	financial	regulators—one	each	for	the	
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banking,	securities,	and	insurance	industries―have	sought	for	over	four	decades	to	coordinate	
policies	and	develop	common	regulatory	standards.	Compared	with	 international	regimes	 like	
the	WTO	or	bilateral	investment	treaties,	regulatory	networks	are	highly	informal:	they	are	not	
established	 by	 treaty,	 but	 rather	 are	 created	 and	 operate	 pursuant	 to	 memoranda	 of	
understanding	 and	 other	 low-level	 agreements	 between	 national	 regulatory	 agencies;	 their	
membership	 is	 not	 global	 but	 is	 limited	 to	 the	 wealthy	 countries	 with	 the	 most	 developed	
financial	sectors;	they	do	not	have	tribunals	that	can	resolve	disputes	between	their	participating	
states;	and	their	policy	output,	or,	as	Zaring	says,	their	rulemaking,	 is	not	formally	binding	on	
their	participating	state	regulatory	agencies.	At	the	same	time,	the	banking	network,	in	particular	
the	Basel	Committee,	wields	significant	power	by	generating	a	considerable	body	of	rules	that	
has	largely	been	implemented	into	national	law	by	domestic	regulators.	Increasingly,	related	to	
this	exercise	of	 rulemaking	power,	 a	 legal	 framework	has	emerged	 to	discipline	 international	
financial	networks.	 In	addition	to	observing	a	number	of	substantive	principles,	Zaring	argues	
that	the	Basel	Committee	subscribes	to	a	notice-and-comment	rulemaking	procedure.	Although	
in	some	respects	this	procedure	mirrors	pluralist	U.S.	rulemaking,	it	is	not	enforced	by	the	courts,	
and	therefore	it	affords	less	protection	for	formal	equality	and	interest	group	competition.			
The	 volume	 concludes	 with	 two	 cases	 that	 can	 be	 characterized	 as	 outliers	 on	 the	
spectrum	of	international	jurisdictions	involved	in	the	global	regulatory	process.	Chapter	20,	by	
Herwig	Hofmann,	reveals	the	high	degree	of	political,	legal,	and	administrative	integration	that	
has	occurred	in	the	European	Union	since	its	founding	in	the	1950s.	Nonetheless,	as	Hofmann	
explains,	the	EU’s	regulatory	system	relies	on	coordination	among	formally	autonomous	national	
regulatory	authorities	and	has	generally	avoided	instituting	a	free-standing	set	of	government	
agencies,	with	independent	constitutional	powers	of	implementation	and	enforcement,	as	exists	
in	 federal	 systems	 like	 Germany	 and	 the	 United	 States.	 This	 structure	 of	 EU	 regulatory	
cooperation	 has	 been	 criticized	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	 undermines	 the	 accountability	 and	
legitimacy	 of	 the	 regulatory	 process.	 Hofmann	 concludes	 that	 the	 accountability	 challenge	 is	
serious	 indeed,	 in	 part	 because	 legal	 prescription	 based	on	 comparison	does	 not	 have	much	
purchase	over	the	complex	realities	of	EU	governance.	In	domestic	jurisdictions,	the	principal–
agent	 model	 of	 legislatures	 and	 bureaucracies	 is	 generally	 used	 to	 craft	 the	 accountability	
Bignami—Comparative	Law	and	Regulation	
	
60	
	
principles	of	administrative	law.	By	contrast,	as	Hofmann	argues,	the	European	Union	operates	
with	a	dizzying	array	of	principals	and	agents	and	therefore	it	cannot	 look	directly	to	national	
experience	to	build	greater	accountability	into	EU	administrative	law.	
The	last	chapter,	by	Eric	Feldman	and	Chelsea	Fish,	analyzes	the	international	system	for	
managing	natural	and	nuclear	disasters,	which	as	of	yet	has	operated	as	a	relatively	insignificant	
jurisdiction	 in	 global	 disaster	 regulation.	 The	 explanation	 for	 the	 low	 level	 of	 international	
cooperation	in	the	disaster	area	is	twofold:	the	domestic	foundations	are	underdeveloped	since	
many	countries,	even	wealthy	ones	 such	as	 Japan,	 lack	a	 robust	 legal	 framework	 for	disaster	
relief;	internationally,	especially	with	respect	to	natural	disasters,	countries	lack	a	shared	sense	
of	 reciprocal	 risk	 because	 the	 harms	 are	 often	 believed	 to	 be	 non-human	 in	 origin	 and	
geographically	 restricted.	 Feldman	 and	 Fish	 conclude	 that	 the	 best	 disaster	 relief	 programs	
reflect	 an	 ethic	 of	 social	 solidarity.	 	 This	 is	 a	 value	which	 can	 be	 found	 across	 very	 different	
societies	and	legal	systems	and	which,	in	the	future,	could	serve	as	the	foundation	for	an	effective	
international	system	of	disaster	regulation.		
	
CONCLUSION	
	
The	 contemporary	 regulatory	 process	 is	 global.	 Markets	 and	 the	 problems	 they	 generate—
consumer	tracking,	parabens	safety,	and	many	others—cross	borders	and	so	too	do	regulatory	
efforts	to	address	those	problems.	As	national	sovereignty	recedes	and	markets	and	jurisdictions	
become	 increasingly	 interdependent,	 the	 high-stakes	 game	 of	 regulation	 is	 no	 longer	 being	
played	within	the	confines	of	the	state	and	the	law	of	single	nations.	A	plurality	of	jurisdictions	
and	 regulatory	 bodies	 are	 called	 into	 action,	 sometimes	 in	 concert	 but	 just	 as	 often	 in	
competition.	
The	 field	 of	 comparative	 law	 and	 regulation	 is	 designed	 to	 create	 the	 intellectual	
foundations	for	analyzing	and	assessing	this	global	regulatory	process.	It	does	so	by	defining	an	
object	of	legal	study	that	is	unconfined	by	the	traditional	organization	of	the	legal	discipline	and	
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that	is	capable	of	sweeping	in	the	law	of	the	regulatory	function	across	the	world.	The	field	is	
thus	flexible	enough	to	include	the	wide	array	of	domestic	and	international	jurisdictions	that	are	
mobilized	in	the	effort	to	regulate	global	policy	problems.	The	field	also	rises	to	the	intellectual	
challenge	of	the	global	regulatory	process	by	identifying	three	critical	features	of	that	process	
that	require	different	types	of	theoretical	inquiry.	Jurisdictional	diversity	and	similarity	are	best	
captured	 by	 classifications	 based	 on	 paradigms	 of	 public	 law	 and	 models	 of	 public–private	
relations.	The	question	of	whether	and	how	convergence	occurs	should	be	studied	using	causal	
theories	 of	 legal	 transplants	 and	 diffusion.	 In	 particular,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 investigate	 how	
disparities	in	political	and	economic	power	influence	the	transfer	of	regulatory	law	and	how	the	
paradigms	of	public	law	and	models	of	public–private	relations	shape	the	reception	of	regulatory	
law.	Legal	prescription	based	on	comparison,	a	favorite	rhetorical	device	in	the	global	regulatory	
process,	should	be	evaluated	based	on	a	normatively	explicit	and	empirically	sensitive	functional	
method	of	comparative	law	research.	These	are	characteristics	that	cut	across	the	many	domestic	
and	international	jurisdictions	involved	in	regulation	and	that	should	be	analyzed	using	the	same	
conceptual	 and	 theoretical	 tools	 regardless	 of	 where	 they	 are	 to	 be	 found,	 domestically	 or	
internationally.	 	Today’s	regulatory	process	may	be	complex	and	may	fail	to	fit	the	traditional	
mold	of	hierarchical	state	law	that	applied	when	regulation	occurred	primarily	within	national	
borders.	But	it	is	still	possible	to	bring	intellectual	order	to	the	contemporary	reality	of	the	global	
regulatory	process.		
The	 chapters	 in	 this	 book	 afford	 a	 vital	 demonstration	 of	 what	 is	 to	 be	 gained	 by	
establishing	 a	 new	 field	 of	 inquiry.	 They	 show	 the	 value,	 for	 the	 various	 political	 and	 legal	
operators	engaged	in	the	global	regulatory	process,	of	presenting	and	analyzing	in	a	single	work	
the	 diverse	 elements	 of	 law	 that	 govern	 the	 regulatory	 process	 and	 that	 shape	 regulatory	
outcomes.	The	contributions	to	this	volume	also	illustrate	the	productive	scholarly	conversations	
and	theoretical	advances	that	can	be	made	by	analyzing	a	single	set	of	questions	across	the	whole	
gamut	of	regulatory	law,	 in	both	domestic	and	international	 jurisdictions,	and	applied	to	both	
public	and	private	actors.	In	sum,	taken	together,	the	chapters	that	follow	reveal	the	practical	
and	 theoretical	 payoffs	 that	 come	 from	 staking	 out	 an	 independent	 domain	 of	 research	 and	
knowledge	building	dedicated	to	understanding	the	global	regulatory	process.			
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This	book	provides	an	important	statement	of	the	field	of	comparative	law	and	regulation.	
But	the	research	agenda	of	the	field	is	ambitious.	As	explained	above,	regulatory	law	includes	
manifold	 topics	 and	 jurisdictions.	 This	 book	 covers	 some	 of	 the	most	 important	 ones,	 but	 a	
number	 of	 others	 have	 been	 left	 to	 future	 research	 endeavors.	 	 Likewise,	 the	 avenues	 of	
theoretical	 inquiry	 that	 are	 central	 to	 the	 field	 are	 complex	 and	 will	 require	 sustained	
investigation	over	 time	 to	build	 a	 solid	 understanding	of	 the	 global	 regulatory	process.	 Legal	
scholarship	must	keep	up	with	the	worldwide	expansion	of	regulation.	The	field	of	comparative	
law	and	regulation	sets	out	a	disciplinary	road	map	for	advancing	on	this	new,	global	terrain.	
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Figure	I.1		The	regulatory	process:	actors	and	relevant	law	
PHASE	ONE:	RULEMAKING	 	 PHASE	TWO:	OVERSIGHT	 	 PHASE	THREE:	ENFORCEMENT	 	 PHASE	FOUR:	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	
PUBLIC	ACTORS	
-Legislature	
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-Contract		
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-Alternative	 dispute	 resolution	
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Table	I.1		Coverage	of	regulatory	law	chapter	by	chapter	
	 RULEMAKING	 OVERSIGHT	 ENFORCEMENT	 JUDICIAL	REVIEW	
Domestic	jurisdictions	
(Parts	II	through	V)	
	
(Part	II)	
Wagner	 (public	
participation—U.S.)	
Smismans	 (public	
participation—EU)	
	
(Part	III)	
Wiener	 and	 Ribeiro	
(impact	 assessment—
multiple	jurisdictions)	
Worthy	 (freedom	 of	
information—UK	 and	
India)a	
(Part	IV)	
Van	 Rooij	 (criminal	 and	
administrative	
enforcement—China)	
Hensler	 (private	 class	
actions—multiple	
jurisdictions)	
	
(Part	V)	
Bignami	 (general	 principles—
U.S.	and	Europe)	
Huang	 and	 Law	
(proportionality—South	
Korea,	Japan,	Taiwan,	China)	
Lamprea,	 Forman,	 and	
Chapman	 (right	 to	 health—
Colombia)	
Rose-Ackerman,	 Egidy,	 and	
Fowkes	 (procedural	
principles—U.S.,	EU,	Germany,	
South	Africa)		
Private	 regulation	
(domestic/international)	
(Part	VI)		
Strauss	 (industry	 standard	
setting—U.S.	and	EU)	
Coglianese	 (performance-
based	regulation—U.S.)	
Worthy	 (freedom	 of	
information—UK	 and	
India)a	
Short	 (corporate	 codes	 of	
conduct—multiple	
jurisdictions)	
Yackee	 (international	
investment	law)b	
International	
jurisdictions	
(Part	VII)	
	
Zaring	 (international	
financial	networks)	
Shaffer	(WTO)c	
Hofmann	 (EU	 composite	
procedures)d	
Hofmann	 (EU	 composite	
procedures)d	
Shaffer	(WTO)c	
Yackee	 (international	
investment	law)b	
	
Note:	The	chapters	in	Section	I	analyze	the	historical	development	of	the	regulatory	state.	
a	Worthy’s	contribution	(included	in	Section	III)	discusses	both	the	public	and	the	private	dimension	of	oversight.		
b	Yackee’s	contribution	(included	in	Section	VII)	analyzes	international	arbitral	tribunals,	which	are	a	form	of	private	international	regulation.		
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c	Shaffer	covers	the	WTO	committee	system,	which	is	an	example	of	oversight,	as	well	as	the	WTO	dispute	resolution	system,	which	is	a	form	of	judicial	review.	
d	The	EU	composite	procedures	covered	by	Hofmann	serve	the	purposes	of	both	regulatory	oversight	and	regulatory	enforcement.	
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Table	I.2		Paradigms	of	public	law	
	
	 Rule	by	law	 Fundamental	rights	
Ballot-box	
democracy	
Transformative	
democracy	
Theory	 State	 action	 pursuant	to	law		
State	 action	 in	
accordance	 with	
fundamental	rights	
Procedural	
democracy	 in	 all	
state	action	
State	 action	
transformed	 by	 law	
and	rights		
Political	context	 Strong	executive,	weak	legislature	and	courts	
Strong	 executive	
and	courts,	distrust	
of	 democratic	
populism	
Weak	 executive,	
strong	 courts	 and	
legislature	
Weak	 state	
(bureaucracy	 and	
traditional	 judiciary),	
weak	 democratic	
process	
Doctrines	 of	
judicial	review	
Authorized	 by	 and	
within	the	scope	of	law	
Rights	 and	
proportionality	test	
“Proceduralized	
rationality	 review,“	
i.e.,	 “hard-look	
review”	
Positive	 rights	 (civil	
and	 political,	 social	
and	economic)	
Oversight	
mechanisms	
	
Relatively	few	 Independent	 rights	bodies	
Classic	 tripartite	
scheme	
Independent	 rights	
and	 accountability	
bodies	
Regulatory	
enforcement	 Public	initiative	
Mostly	 public,	
some	 private	
initiative		
Public	 and	 private	
initiative	 (class	
actions)	
Public	 and	 private	
initiative	 (class	
actions)	
	 	 	 	 	
Cases		 	Japan,	 South	 Korea	(Supreme	Court),	China		
European	 Union,	
European	
countries,	 WTO	
dispute	 resolution	
(free	trade	rights)	
United	States	 Latin	 American	countries,	India	
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Table	I.3		Models	of	public–private	relations	
	
	 Pluralism	 Neo-corporatism	
Theory	 of	 state–society	
relations	 Interest	group	competition	 Interconnected	solidarities	
Constitutional	 law	 on	
public–private	spheres	 Strict	separation		 Mixed	
Public	rulemaking		
	
Formally	 equal	 rights	 of	 private	
participation,	 i.e.,	 notice-and-comment	
rulemaking	
Balanced	 representation	 of	 societal	
groups	on	advisory	committees		
Private	rulemaking	(self-
regulation)	
• No	 legal	 recognition	 of	 specific	
private	 bodies	 in	 public	
regulatory	schemes	
• No	 state	 regulation	 of	 private	
bodies	
	
	
• Legal	 recognition	 of	 private	
bodies	 in	 public	 regulatory	
schemes	
• Balanced	 representation	 in	
private	 bodies	 required	 under	
law	
	
	 	 	
Regulatory	enforcement	
initiated	 by	 private	
parties		
Any	 individual	 as	 long	 as	 certified	 by	
court	as	representative	of	class	
Associations	representative	of	regulatory	
beneficiaries	
	 	 	
Cases		 United	States	
European	 Union,	 European	 countries,	
ISO/IEC	 (international	 private	 standard	
setting)	
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Table	I.4		Main	lines	of	theoretical	development	in	comparative	law	and	regulation	
	
	
a	The	traditional	functional	method	entails	the	following	steps:	definition	of	a	common	social	problem;	identification	of	the	legal	solutions	in	jurisdictions	under	
investigation;	analysis	of	whether	these	solutions	are	similar	or	different;	in	the	case	of	difference,	identification	of	the	“better”	solution.	
	
Key	 characteristics	 of	 the	
global	regulatory	process	
Differences	 and	 commonalities	
between	jurisdictions	
Convergence	 (or	divergence)	of	
jurisdictions	over	time	
Legal	prescription	based	on	comparison	
across	jurisdictions	
Lines	of	theorization	
Classifications	 based	 on	 the	
following	categories:		
• paradigms	 of	 public	 law:	
rule	 by	 law,	 fundamental	
rights,	 ballot-box	
democracy;	
transformative	
democracy;	
• models	 of	 public–private	
relations:	 pluralism	 vs.	
neo-corporatism		
Study	of	diffusion	processes	and	
legal	 transplants	 with	 emphasis	
on:	
• power	 imbalance	 as	 a	
mode	of	legal	transfer;	
• paradigms	 of	 public	 law	
and	 public–private	
relations	 as	 sources	 of	
successful	 or	
unsuccessful	 legal	
reception		
	
	
Adaptation	of	 functional	methoda	 from	
comparative	private	law		
• no	 presumption	 of	 similarity	
when	assessing	legal	solutions;	
• if	 different	 solutions:	 explicitly	
posit	 attributes	 of	 “better”	 law	
and	investigate	empirically	which	
jurisdiction’s	law	possesses	such	
attributes		
